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REFLECTIONS ON THE KILLING STATE:
A CULTURAL STUDY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY UNITED STATES?
DWIGHT AARONS"

Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law. I thank
Judy Cornett, Thomas Y. Davies, John D. Fowler, Sonya Fowler, Mark S. Kende, Joseph H.
King, Jr., and Carol M. Parker for careful reading of and helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Though they may not have always agreed, they treated my ideas with care and respect. I also
thank The University of Tennessee College of Law for generous financial support. Fran
Ansley, Sibyl Marshall, Jean Moore, Donald Paine, Steven R. Thorpe, and Doug Trant provided
source information. I remain responsible for any errors.
I dedicate this Article to my parents, Charles Samuel Aarons and Regina Aarons. I thank
them for all the sacrifices they have made and for their unyielding love. They were my first
teachers and continue to teach me.
A special debt is extended to another Dwight. Years ago, he treated me to the best single
discussion on teaching law. In that discussion he also introduced me to analyzing the
interaction of law and culture. His scholarship inspires me. Later, I wrote the following to a
treasured friend:
One of the nicest things that Fran [Ansley] did for me was to introduce me to Dwight.
. She was of the mind that I needed a mentor. She was right. ... She took it on herself
to approach a man that she had met once and asked if he would serve, if nominated. His
name was Dwight L. Greene, and he said yes. Dwight lived in Queens, New York and
taught at Hofstra Law School. We met in June 1993 in mid-Manhattan. I remember the
meeting almost as if it were last week. One of the things that we talked about was Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsberg, who the day before had been nominated to the Supreme Court. I
remember because he had the New York Times and was pointing out the people that she
quoted after being introduced to the press. We spent about three hours talking and eating
appetizers at what was supposed to be a short, informal meeting to touch base. We hit it
off, and I looked forward to accepting his invitation and calling him up and talking about
issues both big and small.
He reminded me a lot of me. We both went over the names. I think his middle name
was Lawrence, and mine is Lanston. We both wore glasses, could have handled gaining
a little more weight, and, giving myself the benefit of the doubt, I like to think that we
were about even on the receding hairline issue. He also appeared to be a bit absent-minded
*

In any event, after we left the restaurant/bar, when we were on the subway going toward
downtown Manhattan, ... [h]e did express a slight bit of concern about arriving home a
little bit later than he would have liked, but said that the meeting was worth it.
Fortunately, I was quick to write him a note of thanks for taking the time and effort to
meet with me. Unfortunately, the reason that everything is in the past tense is that he was
killed July 5, 1993. . . . I still feel a sense of loss, though I only truly knew him for three
hours. I am better for having met him. When I feel at my wits end, one of the things I
recall is his good-nature, his incisive thoughts on society, law, and being a law teacher.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Formulating strategies for the abolition of the death penalty as this world
journeys through the Twenty-first century and beyond may seem strange to
some. In the abolitionist's view, humans should have long ago realized that
state-sanctioned executions are counterproductive because, among many
reasons, they can only be administered arbitrarily, and the process by which
death sentences are imposed negatively infects and reflects upon that society.
Though outlawed in about 111 nations, the worldwide abolition of the death
penalty has yet to occur, as it is still regularly employed in about 84
countries.' In light of developments in the United States, it is quite possible
that abolition, if it occurs at all, is years away.2
The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics and Culture3
(hereinafter The Killing State) is a book of ten essays from an April 1997
conference at Amherst College, "Capital Punishment in Law and Culture." 4

It has left me with the somewhat rhetorical questions: "What would Dwight do?" and
"What would Dwight say?" I hope that the choices that I have made in such times have
been somewhat consistent with his ideas. I hope to err on the side trying to understand
others and being a constant, but gentle advocate that so much more is possible if, as a
society, we learn how to deal with each other on an individual basis instead of through the
modem day cleavages. I shall continue to try to embody such concepts in my life. One
day I may arrive.
I. See Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty: An International
Perspective,at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicint.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
2. Predictions of this sort are notoriously imprecise. In 1962, one scholar incorrectly
thought that the United States Supreme Court was at least a generation away from addressing
the constitutionality of the death penalty. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 242 (1962). Within ten years of this
thought, the Court ruled that the death penalty as then administered was unconstitutional, and
then four years later, it was deemed a valid form of punishment under rewritten statutes. In
1986, two scholars predicted that the death penalty would be abolished in the United States as
soon as 2001 but no later than 2036. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 148-66 (1986).
Finally, two important actors in the enterprise, at different times, inaccurately estimated the
future course of death penalty jurisprudence. In 1971, Justice Brennan believed that the Court
would never hold capital punishment unconstitutional. See William J. Brennan, Jr.,
ConstitutionalAdjudication andthe DeathPenalty: A Viewfrom the Court, 100 HARv. L. REV.
313, 321 (1986). While in 1976, Chief Justice Burger thought that there would never be
another execution in the United States. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 259 (1979).
3.

THE KILLING STATE: CAPITALPUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Austin

Sarat ed. 1999) [hereinafter THE KILLING STATE].

4. Id. at Acknowledgments. That both a mechanism and a market for conferencegenerated anthologies exist says as much about the academic publishing market, as it does of
the academy's role in society. During the Twentieth Century, scholars have envisioned different
and somewhat contradictory functions of the university. For part of that discussion, see ALAN
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That conference explored how state-authorized killings affect law, politics,
and culture. After reading the bookjacket and the introductory essay, Capital
Punishment as Legal, Political,and Cultural Fact: An Introduction, one
might think that the book addresses the impact that capital punishment has on
modem law and society. The book's general editor, and the apparent driving
force behind it, is Austin Sarat, the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of
Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College and a leader in the Law
and Society Association.5 Sarat essentially promises a wide exploration of the
death penalty. In the Introductory essay, he writes:
What will the persistence of capital punishment mean for our law, politics,
and culture? Will it contribute to or undermine democracy and the rule of
law? Will it nurture a culture of respect and responsibility or of resentment
and recrimination? It is to these questions that the essays collected in this
volume are addressed.6
Thus, a reader might rightfully expect a modem cultural study of the death

BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND:

How

HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FAILED

DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS 47-48, 337-47 (1987)

(criticizing college students and the way in which they are taught in liberal arts); LYNNE V.
CHENEY, TELLNG THE TRUTH: WHY OUR CULTURE AND OUR COUNTRY HAVE STOPPED MAKING

SENSE AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 192-206 (1995) (questioning the apparent prevalence
of postmodem and skeptical thinking and arguing that there should be a return to an objective
truth); DAVID DAMROSCH, WE SCHOLARS: CHANGING THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY 186

(1995) (advocating a more collaborative approach among scholars in their scholarship and
teaching); JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY

OF EDUCATION 1-9 (1916) (touting the role of formal education in developing both the
individual and society); JAMES J.DUDERSTADT, A UNIVERSIFY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 21-24,

38-41, 44-52, 261-89 (2000) (personal reflections by a former large public research university
president on issues challenges facing higher education and need for universities to embrace
inevitable changes in society and in their role); JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION, at Preface (1992) (personal reflections
considering some of problems facing higher education); J. WADE GILLEY, THINKING ABOUT
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE 1990S AND BEYOND 13-15 (1991) (identifying critical

issues that contemporary higher education systems will have to address); GEORGE MARSDEN,
THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY:

FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO

ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994) (reviewing the history of the influence of religion on

intellectual life at universities traditionally viewed as the nation's trend setters); CARYNELSON,
MANIFESTO OF ATENURED RADICAL (1997) (discussing problems facing higher education and

proposing reforms that would make institutions more connected with progressive political
ideals); Symposium, What's the University For?, 2 HEDGEHOG REV. 5 (2000) (exploring the

university's place and purpose in the Twenty-first Century United States).
5.

Judith Resnick, On the Margin: Humanitiesand Law, 10 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 413,

413 n.35 (1998).
6.

THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 4.
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penalty,7 with particular attention paid to how capital punishment affects
politics and law. This is an ambitious goal: to connect a body of law to its
deeper meaning and its impact on a society. Establishing a connection
between some social problems and capital punishment would seem to require
substantial research, yet would be an invaluable enterprise. It is not hard to
imagine how useful such work would be, especially in light of several recent
multiple killings.' If persuasively written and adequately documented, such
scholarship could provide support for revising both penal laws and the
criminal litigation process to more directly prevent criminal violence. Further,
if criminal violence is substantially reduced, it would be easier to foresee the
death penalty abolished.
Unfortunately, The KillingState fails to tie its theorizing to either history,
relevant academic literature, or societal problems. The book does not
establish that a society's culture, law, and politics are invariably contaminated
by pursuing and having executions. Though classified as an assessment of the
cultural impact of capital punishment, the essays in The Killing State do not
consider the cultural expressions of groups that are most heavily impacted by
the death penalty or those segments of this country that most frequently use
the sanction. Consequently, The Killing State presents an incomplete picture
of the cultural and social impact of capital punishment in the United States.

7. For a cultural study of the death penalty covering nearly the first century of the United
States, see LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE

1776-1865 (1989). A more recent book considers

the history of capital punishment in the United States and that history's impact on modem
capital punishment practices. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2002).
8. Some of the more widely covered incidents include sniper killings in Maryland,
Virginia, and Washington D.C., see Descentinto Evil, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4,2002, at 20; killings
at Appalachian Law School in Virginia, see Francis X. Clines, 3 Slain at Law School; Student
is Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at Al 8; the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City
and Washington, D.C., see Tim Golden, A Day of Terror: The Operation-TerrorismCarefully
Synchronized and Devastatingly Effective, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A 13; a shooting at
a Fort Worth, Texas church, see FuneralsHeldfor 4 of Church Gunman's Victims, HOUSTON
CHRON., Sept. 19, 1999, at AI; shootings in Atlanta by a stock trader, see Craig Schneider &
Sophia Lezin Jones, Rampage leaves mental scars: The city and survivors of Mark Barton's
deadly spree are strugglingtofind ways to heal, ATL. J. & CONST., Aug. 2, 1999, at 1A; a mass
killing by two students at their high school in Littleton, Colorado, see Mike Williams, 'Make
sense of it? We can't: Coloradotown grappleswith its grief, AmL. J. & CONST., Apr. 21, 1999,
at IA; killings in Springfield, Oregon by a high school freshman, see Timothy Egan, Oregon
Freshman Goes to Court as Number of Deaths Rises to 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at Al;
a shooting at an Arkansas middle school by two of its students, see John Schwartz, 2 Boys
Chargedwith Murder: Ark. Ambush Suspects Are Friends, II and 13, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
1998, at Al; a killing spree in Pearl, Mississippi, see Thomas B. Edsall, Mississippi Boy Held
in School Killing Spree, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1997, at A3; and a shooting at a Paducah,
Kentucky high school, see Stephen Braun, Answers to Killings Elusive, Town Finds, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at AI.
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Thus, despite its contention otherwise, the book is not a cultural study of the
death penalty. It is therefore unlikely to play as meaningful a role in bringing
about the abolition of the death penalty because it will not force many to
reconsider their views on capital punishment. In other words, it is highly
unlikely that the book will prompt its readers to consider how the death
penalty operates and its effect on the culture, law, and politics of the United
States. Those who do reflect on capital punishment's impact on culture, law,
and politics may do so more because The Killing State did not fulfill its
asserted aim rather than because of the book's actual content.
Part 11 of this Article summarizes and comments on each essay in the
book. Part III discusses Robert Cover and the book's adoption of his
metaphor of legal interpretation as violence. According to the metaphor, a
person relies on his or her understanding of the world when engaging in legal
interpretation. The interpreter commits violence, however, when he or she
imposes his or her reading of the law on others. The Killing State does not
include any of Cover's essays, but his presence is felt throughout the book.
Part IV explores the apparent premises of the essayists in The Killing State.
Part V reviews aspects of the death penalty's impact on interpretation of the
federal constitution and habeas corpus law. Part VI looks at whether The
Killing State is truly a cultural exploration of the death penalty by considering
subcultures within the United States and some of the goals of law and society
scholarship. Part VII considers Tennessee in particular and whether it has
become culturally, politically, or legally deficient by resuming executions in
2000. Finally, Part VIII are my reflections on death penalty legal scholarship
and the role it may play in moving toward the abolition of the death penalty.
II.

THE KILLING STA TE:

A DETAILED SUMMARY

According to the book's introductory essay, "it now appears that the
killing state will be a regular part of the landscape of American politics for a
long time to come." The essayists in the book "are united in their belief that
scholarship on the death penalty has to go beyond treating it as simply a
terrain of moral argument and policy contest."' Accordingly,
[t]he contributors to this volume address the powerful symbolic politics of
the death penalty, the way capital punishment pushes to, and beyond, the
limits of law's capacity to do justice justly, and the place of the politics of
state killing in contemporary 'culture wars.' .... It is the contention of the
essays contained in this volume that we can learn a lot about the kind of
society we live in by examining the way that society punishes, including
whether it uses death as punishment."

9.

10.
I.

THE KuJJNG STATE, supra note 3, at 3.

Id. at 4.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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To carry forth its assertion that discussions of capital punishment should not
be limited to discussions on the law, the essayists in The Killing State come
from various disciplines, which they draw upon in their essays.
The book's first section, "The Politics of State Killing," looks at the
relationship between state killings and democracy. This section, comprised
of four essays, evidences a broad interpretation of "politics," as they are
generally not concerned with the science of government. In the first essay,
After the Terror : Morality, Equality, Fraternity,Anne Norton, a political
scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, details how the oppressed classes
in England, France, and their former colonies used violence to throw off the
shackles of monarchy and colonialism. 2 Norton's essay notes that today the
power dynamics are reversed. That is, instead of the citizenry rebelling
against an unjust government and using executions to bring about political and
possibly social equality, now the death penalty-though invoked in the name
ofthe government ("The State v." or "The People v.")-is most often directed
against a community's outcasts. Notwithstanding the authority switch, she
says "we modems, we liberals, we constitutionalists are subjects of (and
subject to) a history in which capital punishment serves not the powerful but
the dominated, not the state, but the subject .... In this history, capital
punishment figures not as the exhaustion of law but as its inauguration."'"
The essay starts promisingly, detailing the regicides of Louis Capet in France
and Charles Stuart in England, and the leveling power of those revolutions.
However, it fades in trying to connect the modem death penalty with the
writings of thinkers, like psychoanalyst and philosopher Franz Fanon,' 4
Jacques Derrida, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucalt, and
Louis Althusser. According to Norton, Fanon suggested that killers-whether
as individuals or the government-are responsible for their actions.
Norton equivocates on abolishing the death penalty. In support of it, she
notes that the punishment of death signifies to the nation and its citizens the
gravity of the crime. She further opines that capital punishment can be
viewed as a form of domination to which everyone, including the powerful,
can be subjected. 5 In apparent opposition to the death penalty, Norton
suggests that despite its potential leveling power, having the death penalty and
not using it would be a magnanimous exercise of the sovereign's prerogative.
Accordingly she concludes her essay with this quote from Nietzsche: "It is
not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness ofpower that
it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it, letting those who harm

12.
13.

Id. at 27.
Id.

14.

Norton relies most heavily on portions of FRANZ FANON, WRETCHED OF THE EARTH

(1963) (Constance Farrington trans., 1968), in which Fanon wrote of the violence that is
supposedly necessary to bring about liberation from colonialism and the onset of democracy.
15. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 36-37.
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it go unpunished." 6
Norton essentially tries to connect the formation of modem democracies
with the writings of later philosophers. Curiously, she largely eschews
political philosophers. What her essay actually suggests is that those in
control of the government-whether a monarch or those in revolt-use the
state's authority for their own benefit. So long as this occurs, then
Nietzsche's aphorism will remain only an aspiration. However, Nietzsche's
maxim is an overstatement. Few actually argue that capital offenders should
"go unpunished." Capital punishment abolitionists, for instance, maintain that
criminals should not be executed, though they should otherwise remain
subject to confinement. Thus, the capital abolitionist position is nobler than
that of death penalty supporters because they argue that the state should
choose not to impose the ultimate punishment on the properly convicted.
On another level, Norton's essay seems incomplete. She uses the
Regicide and Reign of Terror as examples and relies mostly on Fanon's
writings seeking to end European colonial rule. To be sure, these three
periods included the violent overthrow of government. One wonders,
however, if she would have been able to dispel the apparent contradictions in
the present capital punishment practices of Europe and former European
colonies. For instance, the European Union and its member nations have
abolished the death penalty, but most of former European colonies are
retentionist countries. 7 Thus, it may be that the history of the "founding of
the modem, liberal, constitutional order,"' 8 which she suggests haunts all
modem democracies, in reality, is not that influential.
In the next essay, Hugo Adam Bedau, a philosophy professor at Tufts
University and one of the leading and most prolific abolitionist writers,
challenges the death penalty at its core. In Abolishing the Death Penalty Even
for the Worst Murderers,he argues that the worst kind of murderer-which
he defines as a serial, multiple, or recidivist killer-should, at most, be
sentenced to life imprisonment and should not receive a death sentence.' 9
Bedau contends that substantive due process, liberty, autonomy, and privacy
are each a basis for prohibiting capital punishment. Bedau advocates what he
calls a "'substantive due process' argument."20 According to Bedau,
"[s]ociety, acting through the authority of its government, must not enact and
enforce policies that impose more restrictive-invasive, harmful,
violent-interference with human liberty, privacy, and autonomy than are
absolutely necessary as the means to achieve legitimate and important social

16. Id. at37.
17.
(1996).

18.
19.
20.

See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY IN WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE Appendix
THE KILIJNG STATE, supra note 3, at 27.
Id. at41-42.
Id. at 47.
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objectives."'"
The death penalty is excessive punishment, Bedau says,
because abolitionist states have controlled criminal homicides and
incapacitated their most violent offenders, at least as effectively as
neighboring death penalty jurisdictions.22
Congratulations to Bedau for advancing the abolitionist argument where
the claim is conceivably the weakest. If he convinces readers that
incapacitating and not executing the serial, multiple, or recidivist killer is the
most appropriate punishment, then it is likely that in most instances the death
penalty will be deemed excessive punishment. Retribution is the governing
rationale behind capital punishment, and Bedau attempts to temper
retributivist sentiment by focusing on the criminal's worth and by limiting the
state's treatment of him.2 3 Bedau's claim is an old argument fashioned to
survive the ultimate acid test. With reasoning similar to that of Justice
Marshall in Furman v. Georgia,2" Bedau states that "the role of a system of
punishment in a modem civilized society really is only as a means to the
legitimate end of a society without criminal violence."2 5 Though he does not
claim that they are all legitimate ends of punishment, Bedau maintains that
revenge, retribution, and desert can adequately be addressed by life
imprisonment.26
Bedau's essay, unfortunately, will likely convince only the already
converted. Studies have shown that support for capital punishment is not
based on perceptions of general social utility. Rather, even after being
informed that a death sentence will only end the life of the murderer and not
serve any other purpose, most capital punishment advocates still typically
maintain that the death penalty is necessary to avenge the death of the victim.
That is, they maintain that an execution-and not incapacitation-is the only
fit punishment for a killer.27
Bedau constructs his argument in the abstract. Until adequate data on the
nature of murderers and the causes of such killings is available, this method
may be the required approach when arguing against the death penalty. When
discussing the death penalty, supporters of capital punishment are more apt to
focus on the facts of the crime and not on any of its antecedent causes. Those
facts often make it difficult not to shout, "Execute him!" Consider, for
example, the exchange between Justices Blackmun and Scalia in Callins v.

21. Id.
22. Id.at 49.
23. Id.at5l-52.
24. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342-60 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(exploring the rationales traditionally advanced for maintaining the death penalty).
25. Id.at51.
26. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 47-49.
27.

See,e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition ofDeterrence,113 HARV. L. REv. 413,

437-38 (1999).
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Collins.8 In response to Justice Blackmun's soliloquy against the death
penalty and his conclusion that the death penalty could not be administered
in a manner consistent with the Constitution, Justice Scalia noted that Justice
Blackmun chose to write in "one of the less brutal of the murders that
regularly come before us." '29 Scalia mentioned that another appeal before the
Court, in which Blackmun had not chosen to condemn the death penalty,
involved an "1 1-year-old girl raped by four men and then killed by stuffing
her panties down her throat," and he stated, "[h]ow enviable a quiet death by
lethal injection compared with that!"30 It is noteworthy that Scalia focuses on
the brutality of the killing as a measure for the type of punishment that the
state may impose. Typically, the lex talionisvariant ofretribution (commonly
called an "eye for an eye") holds that the state may kill a murderer as
punishment for the killing an innocent person. Supporters of capital
punishment, however, do not insist that the murderer be executed in the same
manner as the victim was killed.3 More importantly, federal constitutional
law requires that any sentence comport with human dignity.32
A JuridicalFrankenstein,or Death in the Hands ofthe State3 3 by Julie M.
Taylor, an anthropologist at Rice University, looks at the cultural implications
of police killings in Argentina. Taylor recounts how the Argentine police,
particularly from 1976 to 1983, developed into an independent force that
perpetrated violence on its citizens. According to her, Argentina became a
"delinquent state" as its military and civilian leaders silenced their critics,
often through secret killings.34 She states that the killing of government critics

28. 510 U.S. 1141,1141-58(1994).
concurring).
29. Id. at 1142 (Scalia, J.,
30. Id. at 1143. Inalaterresponse, Blackmun explained that the facts ofthe second case,
McCollum v. North Carolina, further suggested to him that the death penalty system did not
adequately determine which defendants deserved death. Blackmun noted that of the four
defendants charged with the crime, only McCollum, who was mentally retarded, was sentenced
to death, despite there being no evidence that he took the lead in committing the crime. See
dissenting).
McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1255 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN NATHANSON,AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING
BY DEATH 74-75 (1987); ERNESTVAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHINGCRIMINALS: CONCERNINGA VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 193 (1975).
32. The punishment cannot be "excessive." The test of "excessiveness" has two
components. "First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
33. THE KILLNG STATE, supra note 3, at 60.
34. Id. at 69. Taylor outlines how Isabel Per6n authorized the armed forces to take over
police functions. The authorization was done purportedly to deal with subversive guerrilla
elements that were fomenting insurrection. Id. Not only were these devices unnecessary as the
guerrillas had been defeated, they were used by the military systematically to abduct, detain, and
torture native Argentineans. Id. Some of these victims were "physically eliminated." Id. at 6970. Taylor later likens the more recent practices of the Argentine police force to the military's
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was done "not to eliminate physically the person who has been killed, but to
control those that remain alive, mainly through fear, but also at times, through
the shattering of social ties and the removal of leadership."3 5 Taylor's
assessment reads like an utilitarian critique of capital punishment. She
highlights the corrosive impact that state-sanctioned, arbitrary punishment can
have on the state, its law enforcement officers, its legal system, and its
citizens. Though discussions of criminals, violence, and crime usually do not
focus on police officers, Taylor's essay reminds those who may have forgotten
that law enforcement authorities have the capacity to violate the law."
The concluding essay in the politics section is Tokens of Our Esteem:
3 7 by Jonathan
AggravatingFactorsin the Era ofDeregulatedDeathPenalties
Simon and Christina Spaulding. They describe how since Gregg v. Georgia,3"
state laws have increased their aggravating circumstances, and they assess the
implications of this increase. Simon, a law professor at the University of
Miami, and Spaulding, a public defender in Florida, take an important,
technical aspect of capital punishment, describe its development, and suggest
what these developments may say about our society.
Aggravating circumstances were introduced into United States death
penalty jurisprudence in 1976 as a way to ensure that only the most deserving
defendants were sentenced to death.39 In 1971, the United States Supreme
Court stated that there was no appreciable way to "identify before the fact
those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call
for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which
can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority .
"..."40
Notwithstanding the apparent impossibility of describing when the death
penalty should be imposed, the Court held that it did not violate Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to permit the jury to impose a death
sentence without any governing legal standards. 4' However, the following
year, the Court decided-partly because juries were being given unrestricted

conduct during the military dictatorship. Id. at 70-75.
35.

Id. at 76.

36. See, e.g., Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1984). In Carey, the Second Circuit, before addressing the due process
protections afforded to prison guards suspected of trafficking contraband into the penal
institution, asked: "who are to guard the guards?" Id. at 192.
In this country, law enforcement officials are routinely investigated for the lawfulness of their
conduct. Prosecutions arising out of these investigations, however, are more rare. More closely
connected to capital punishment is the under enforcement of ethical standards and other rules
that govern prosecutorial and judicial conduct in capital cases. See Penny J.White, Errorsand
Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1265, 1280-86 (2001).
37. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 81.
38. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
39. See cases cited infra note 43.
40. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
41. Id. at 196.
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and unguided authority to impose a sentence of life or death-that the death
penalty was being randomly and arbitrarily administered throughout the
United States in violation of the Eighth Amendment.4 2 In 1976, under newly
redrawn statutes, the Court parted from its decision in Furman and once again
upheld the imposition of the death penalty.4 3 The redrawn statutes, in the
Court's opinion, suitably directed and limited the discretion of the sentencing
authority. 4 Thus, the sentencing authority would be directed to the specific
circumstances of the crime and the defendant's background when considering
what sentence to impose. Properly used, aggravating circumstances would
have made it unlikely that sentencers would invariably conclude that every
murder deserved the death sentence or that every murderer should be
executed. In short, aggravating circumstances were part of the processes that
ensured that the death penalty operated in a meaningful, rational manner and
that it was not inflicted arbitrarily or capriciously. 45 According to Simon and
Spaulding, aggravating circumstances were not only gatekeepers for
prosecutors in determining the cases in which a death sentence could be
sought but were also viewed as tour guides for juries on whether the penalty
was appropriate in that case. Aggravating circumstances were also seen as
salient factors for judges assessing the systematic imposition of death
sentences. That is, when reviewing capital cases, appellate judges could look
at the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the
death penalty was being imposed in a rational and consistent manner.'
Over time, the role of aggravating circumstances has changed, and there
has been a proliferation of aggravating circumstances. Lowenfieldv. Phelps,47
is representative of some of the changes. In Lowenfield, the Court held that
an aggravating circumstance could be identical to an element of capital
murder of which the defendant had been convicted, so long as the statutory
definition of capital murder did not include all homicides.4" Lowenfield
essentially allows a capital defendant to be sentenced to death upon being
found guilty of the capital crime. This is because before any evidence is
admitted in a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury, by finding the defendant
guilty of the capital homicide charge, has already found beyond a reasonable
42. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
207 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976).
44. Those statutes typically contained a list of aggravating circumstances and a nonexhaustive list of mitigating circumstances. At least one aggravating circumstance had to exist
and it had to outweigh the mitigating circumstances before a death sentence could be imposed.
See Gregg,428 U.S. at 196-97; Proflitt, 428 U.S. at 248-50; Jurek,428 U.S. at 273-74.
45.. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-206; Proffitt,428 U.S. at 250-53; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 26876.
46. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06; Proffil, 428 U.S. at 252-53,258-59; Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 270-73.
47. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
48. Id. at 241.
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doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances. Thus,
Simon and Spaulding correctly note that aggravating circumstances may open
"the door to the inner house of death but, after Lowenfield they do not
'
proscribe what goes on inside."49
The legal developments are more extensive than Simon and Spaulding
describe. Since 1983, the United States Supreme Court has all but muted the
conversation among state prosecutors, juries, appellate courts, and the
legislature on the appropriateness of particular aggravating circumstances.
For instance, in Zant v. Stephens,50 the Court held that the Constitution does
not require that sentencers be instructed as to what weight to give any of the
sentencing phase evidence on aggravating or mitigating circumstances." In
Blystone v. Pennsylvania," the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute requiring
the imposition of the death penalty if aggravating circumstances were found
to exist but no mitigating circumstances were present,53 and in Boyde v.
California,54 the Court approved a jury instruction that mandated imposition
of the death penalty if the jury concluded that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances."
Statutes like those approved in Lowenfield, Blystone, and Boyde increase
the likelihood of the defendant being sentenced to death.56 These legal
developments mean that after securing a conviction, prosecutors do not have
to spend considerable effort in proving the existence of the aggravating
circumstances or in establishing how their existence makes the crime more
worthy of death. Consequently, aggravating circumstances can be viewed as

49.

THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 87.

50.
51.
52.

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Id. at 880.
494 U.S. 299 (1990).

53.

Id.
at 305.

54. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
55. Id. at 377.
56. All three cases raise special problems when the jury is the sentencing authority.
Lowenfield is problematic because it may be more difficult for the jury to meaningfully
distinguishing between cases in which the death sentence should be imposed and those in which
itshould not.
Under laws like those approved of in Blystone and Boyde, the jury may not give careful
attention to the mitigating circumstances. This is because the jury's duty of assessing the
mitigating circumstances is more explicit when it is instructed that, in deciding what sentence
to impose, it is to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.
However, under Blystone and Boyde the risk is greater that the jury will not fully appreciate that
the defendant's production of any mitigating circumstance evidence will dissipate its otherwise
mandatory obligation to impose a death sentence. Further, the jury is also deprived of its ability
to exercise mercy, which has been one if its prerogatives at least since Gregg. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 203. Finally, shifting to the defendant the burden of establishing that a death sentence
should not be imposed is inconsistent with the capital sentencing processes approved of in the
1976 cases and in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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costless expressions of legislative judgment." Further, instead of helping to
ensure that the death penalty is imposed in a rational manner, according to
Simon and Spaulding, aggravating circumstances now "seem to have their real
audience and their real currency as elements of a populist politics of
vengeance and solidarity based on pain and outrage. They now circulate as
tokens of our esteem doled out by our representatives to placate or reward
special interest groups."" Simon and Spaulding's essay shows that if fear of
violence is the primary motivation for criminal punishment, then there are few
limits to defining crimes or imposing punishment on those who instill fear.59
The three essays in The Killing State's middle section, "Capital
Punishment and Legal Values," more directly address capital punishment
jurisprudence. This section begins with Peter Fitzpatrick's "Always More to
Do ": CapitalPunishment and the (De)Compositionof Law. 0 Fitzpatrick, a
law professor at Queen Mary and Westfield College, argues that "law cannot
accommodate either the general decision to have capital punishment or the
particular decision to kill someone."'" By exploring the theoretical meaning
of law and the difference between law and justice, Fitzpatrick looks for ways
in which more can be done to examine the full impact of the death penalty on
a society. To establish that law is incomplete and duplicitous, Fitzpatrick
recounts descriptions of crowds at executions and examines the discourse in
United States Supreme Court opinions.62 Instead of recounting how several
people at an execution objected to the event, however, Fitzpatrick ignores that
he is relying on different observers' descriptions of different execution crowds
in England and in Germany.63 This also makes it easier for Fitzpatrick to
come to the conclusion that he does.'
While he acknowledges the
subjectivity of descriptions, Fitzpatrick nonetheless contends that the accounts
indicate that executions did not instill in the crowd the proper reverence for

57. See, e.g., id. at 318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 100.
59. Cf Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, I J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 97 (1997) (using cultural studies analysis to consider whether the social construction of
gang membership of a black man was used as a substitute for evidence of guilt in a criminal
trial).
60. THE KILLING STATE, supranote 3, at 117. Fitzpatrick borrows from a capital defense
attorney and Roger Hood in naming his essay. The defense attorney explained that more could
always be done to prevent a client from being executed, and Hood suggested that a novice to
the death penalty might think that from a philosophical and policy perspective "there appears
to be nothing new to be said" about it. Id. at 117 n.3 (quoting ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH
PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 6 (1996)).
61. Id.at 118.
62. Id. at 124.
63. Id.at 125.
64. To him, these discrepancies do not matter because the crowd seldom agreed that the
execution was legitimate and often questioned whether the sovereign was the true murderer.
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the law or the punishment."5 In actuality, Fitzpatrick's accounts may show
that at different executions, some protested the execution or used the public
gathering as an occasion for broadcasting their views." Fitzpatrick's point
may have been more persuasive had he used different reports from several
executions, which detailed the widespread irreverence or solemnity of the
events.
Perhaps due to unfamiliarity with the United States' legal system and
heavy reliance on a secondary source,67 Fitzpatrick also misattributes to the
United States Supreme Court cases actually decided by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.6 His essay suggests as well that he may not understand the
limited scope of equal protection. 9 As to his legal point, despite our inability

65. Id. at 125-28.
66. Id.
67. See PETER HODGKINSON ET AL., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN.THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 12 (1996).
68. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 130-31. Fitzpatrick cites Smith v. Kemp, 715
F.2d 1459 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983) and Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d
236 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983), in his discussion of United States
Supreme Court discourse. The Supreme Court declined to review both decisions.

This mistake brings to mind Robert Bork's comment on statements falsely attributed to him
regarding Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), after he was nominated for

the United States Supreme Court. He wrote, "Not only didn't I decide the case, I have never
written about it or even discussed it. I can only suppose that Planned Parenthood was applying
the familiar rule that equity regards as done that which ought to have been done. In their view,
if I didn't make that ruling, I should have." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 289 (1990).
Bork is not the first high court nominee asked to explain opinions that he neither participated
in nor wrote. For example, during his confirmation hearings to become Chief Justice of the
United States, Associate Justice Abe Fortas was questioned about several cases that were
decided before he became a member of the Court. See Nominations ofAbe Fortasand Homer
Thornberry: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 189-209 (1968)
(included questions regarding Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964), Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), and Albertson v. Subversive Activities ControlBd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965)).
69. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 131. Fitzpatrick writes as though the Equal
Protection Clause is unbounded. It is not. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982) (stating that the equality principle is devoid of content;
equality has content only when there is a referent).
In discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), Fitzpatrick states that if statistical
evidence were admitted in capital cases neither black defendants nor poor defendants could be
executed. Fitzpatrick's analysis fails to acknowledge the necessity of a causal connection
between race or poverty and imposition of the death penalty. His reasoning also does not take
into account that the Equal Protection Clause only protects similarly situated groups from
improper governmental action, that the level ofjudicial scrutiny depends on the classification
of the category, and that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and poverty
classifications are not.
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to truly experience or know death while we are alive, it is not foolish to expect
that the state have, at least, a rational, legal basis for its decisions to execute
its citizens. The inaccuracies in Fitzpatrick's work undermines the
persuasiveness of his effort. He is partly right, though, in concluding "that
decisions about capital punishment 'ultimately rest upon the subjective moral
evaluations of prosecutors, juries, and judges' that any issue 'concerning the
death penalty is ultimately a matter for moral and political judgment."' 7
What he does not acknowledge is that even if the decisions whether to have
capital punishment and whether to impose it are moral ones, that moral battle
has been waged on a legal playing field for more than a generation. 7 '
Fitzpatrick's essay would have been more rewarding if he had explained the
moral prohibition against capital punishment and how the law could be made
more responsive to and consistent with that prohibition.
The next two essays are highlights of the book. In The Executioner's
Dissonant Song: On Capital Punishment and American Legal Values,72
Franklin E. Zimring, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley,
discusses the implications of capital punishment for the United States' law
and legal practice. Zimring believes that an inherent conflict exists between
a system of regular executions and the asserted principles of the United
States' legal culture.73 According to Zimring, conflict in capital cases occurs
on three levels: the denial of human dignity inherent in executing a person;
the undermining of integrity of the legal process in capital cases through
efforts to reduce delays between executions; and the corrosive impact that
circumventing due process in capital cases has on the criminal litigation
system.74 Zimring's primary focus is on the latter two areas, which actually
coalesce into the question of whether executions should ever become routine

70. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 132 (quoting ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH
PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 157-58, 162 (1996)).
71. Perhaps reflecting frustration with efforts of abolitionists to forestall an execution
through use of the courts, one Justice has written, "The heavily outnumbered opponents of
capital punishment have successfully opened yet another front in their guerilla war to make this
unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical impossibility." Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Around the same time, during the oral argument of a different capital case, the same Justice
suggested that lawyers representing capital defendants should "[t]ryharder" to avoid last minute
stay requests. See Transcript of Oral Argument at * 7, McFarland v. Scott, No. 93-6497, 1994
WL 665012 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1994); see also Linda Greenhouse, Court ConfrontingResults of
Limiting Death Row Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at Al (quoting Justice Scalia as
telling the director of a capital defense organization: "I just want you to know that I am not
happy with the performance of the Texas Resource Center in the cases that come before me.
Try harder").
72. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 137.
73. Id. at 138.
74. Id. at 137.
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events.75 For that to happen, Zimring says, the period between sentence and
execution will have to be reduced and courts would have to restructure or
ignore capital defendants' rights. 76 Restructuring or ignoring capital
defendants' rights will inevitably allow courts to compromise the rights of
defendants in noncapital cases. 77 According to Zimring, "[t]he death penalty
in the United States can only be principled if it is not efficient; it can only be
expeditious if it is morally and procedurally arbitrary. 7 8
Zimring's
observations are borne out by the experience of states that have resumed
regular executions since 1976-especially Texas. 79 None of these states has
a capital case processing system that routinely and vigorously respects capital
defendants' rights. In fact, since 1976, few jurisdictions have, for more than
a short time, adopted a capital punishment case processing system that is both
efficient and fair."0
Anthony Amsterdam's Selling a Quick Fixfor Boot Hill: The Myth of
Justice Delayed in Death Cases"' deals with the United States Supreme
Court's increasing tendency since 1982 to vacate stays of execution imposed
by the lower federal courts. In most instances, the defendant is executed
within hours of the lifting of the stay. 2 Amsterdam, a law professor at New
York University, exposes the illogic of the practice, explaining that it

75.

Id. at 140-47.

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147. Elsewhere, I have written on the issues involved in delay in capital cases.

See generally Dwight Aarons, Can InordinateDelayBetween a Death Sentence andExecution
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147 (1998); Dwight
Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps TowardAddressing andAvoiding InordinateDelay
in CapitalCases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1998).

79. See Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death
Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1,2 (1994); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS: LETHAL INJUSTICE 3 (1998) (stating

that "Texas executes more people than any other jurisdiction in the Western World").
80. Federal law may soon bring about formal documentation of the inequalities of the
modem capital punishment system. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), to achieve an accelerated schedule for the filing and consideration of postconviction petitions by state capital defendants, states must be certified as providing (1)
mechanisms for the appointment and compensation of defense counsel, (2) payment of
reasonable litigation expenses, and (3) standards for assessing the competency of defense
counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2000).
-Despite states' arguments in federal court that they have adequate capital case processing
systems, no federal court has found that a state has satisfied those requirements. See RANDY
HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3.3 a, at

123-29 (4th ed. 2001) (collecting cases as of July 2001).
81. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 148.
82. In the most prominent instance, the Court prohibited the entry of any further stays of
California's execution of Robert Alton Harris. See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000
(1992).
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denigrates the work of the district court and court of appealsjudges and shows
how some of the Court's language in its orders portrays an incomplete picture
of both the capital litigation process and the role of capital defense attorneys.8 3
The apparent exasperation evident in Amsterdam's essay seems to be both
because death comes to the condemned through a state-sanctioned execution,
and because death occurs through a drastic change in judicial procedures.
According to Zimring, the change undermines the judicial review process.84
Zimring and Amsterdam's contributions are laudable because they are both
clearly written and they marshal law and history to convey their message.
Amsterdam's extensive documentation of his contentions adds to the
persuasiveness of his argument.8 5
The final section, "The Death Penalty and the Culture of Responsibility,"
consists of three essays, which in contrast to the rest of the book, more
directly explore capital punishment's influence on culture. These essays
require careful reading and probably could have been made more
understandable by clearer writing. While implicitly defining "culture"
broadly, including the unwritten norms and expectations within a society, the
essays discuss only the tangible products of a society.
The section begins with William E. Connolly's The Will, Capital
Punishment, and Cultural Wars. 6 Connolly, a political science professor at
John Hopkins University, discusses the prominence of free will in theories of
criminal responsibility. Connolly first briefly recounts the roles that free will,
responsibility, and punishment have played historically, as described in the
work of criminal law theorists.8 7 He notes that most theoretical discussions
of these terms ignore the uncertainty and instability that is within them. 8
According to Connolly, the United States' cultural construct-as reflected in
social science research, judicial opinions, news reports, election campaigns,
jury selection processes, and jury deliberations reports-allows people to
ignore essentially malleable concepts like free will, responsibility, and
proportionality of punishment.8 9 These cultural components make what is

83. Id. at 154-57.
84. The Court's vacatur of stays of executions affects a district judge's decision to grant
a stay in a subsequent case. One student has researched the impact of the Court's rulings on
lower federal courts' consideration of stays of execution in state capital cases. Nicole Veilleux,
Note, Staying Death Penalty Executions: An Empirical Analysis of Changing Judicial
Attitudes, 84 GEO. L.J. 2543 (1996). Veilleux surveyed nearly five hundred published stay
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and all federal courts within the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits from 1981 to 1995. She determined that the Supreme Court's reinterpretation
of federal habeas law and renewed federalism concerns were the reasons for an increased refusal
by the federal courts to grant stays of execution. Id. at 2571.
85. See THE KILUING STATE, supra note 3, at 165-183.
86. Id. at 187.
87. Id. at 187-193.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 195-96.
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difficult and fuzzy seem easy and sharply focused. For instance, the state, in
seeking to inflict the ultimate punishment on the defendant, argues that he
freely chose to commit the crime and thus deserves punishment. The defense,
perhaps with the help of social workers, questions the true cause of the crime
and highlights society's responsibility toward the defendant. Consequently,
[i]n such a predetermined context of legal argument, the prosecutor appears
to be a clear thinker with coherent categories while the social worker
emerges as a fuzzy idealist trying to force two opposing conceptions of the
world into one story line. The first agent appears to embody the clarity of
'our culture' while the second struggles to twist that clarity to save the life
of a defendant? 0
According to Connolly, increased globalization, with its accompanying
disintegration of the nation-state, has led to increased interest in the exercise
of official punitive authority.91 In a world in which once fundamental truths
are now under constant attack and re-definition, capital punishment's value
extends beyond the criminal law.92 The death penalty has become a barometer
of cultural values.
It mobilizes political divisions between one set of partisans, who seek to
return to a fictive world in which the responsible individual, retributive
punishment, the market economy, the sovereign state, and the nation
coalesced, and another set, who seek to respond in more generous ways to
new experiences of the cultural contingency of identity, the pluralization of
culture, the problematical character of traditional conceptions of agency and
responsibility, and the role of the state in a new world order.93
A consequence of using the death penalty as such a barometer is that those
opposed to capital punishment are not only stigmatized, but they are also
marginalized. As Connolly puts it, "[p]ublic objections by liberals miss the
point unless we are able to challenge the line of associations between
morality, simplicity, revenge and death. Until we do, the agents of cultural
war will succeed in using our opposition to associate us with moral softness
toward murderers . . . ."" In other words, traditional critiques of capital
punishment have become insufficient.
Connolly proposes that abolitionists instead first focus on explaining to
those who only marginally support capital punishment of the artificial
construct behind the sanction and how that artificiality is maintained despite

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at .197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 200.
id. at 201.
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its negative impact on a nation's culture.95 Abolitionists also have to "expose
cultural sources of the intense social resentment in circulation today, and we
need to probe more carefully the politics by which it so readily becomes
shifted onto a selective set of targets."" Finally, abolitionists have "to join
political movements that speak to those economic, educational, and social
circumstances that encourage so many to resent their place in a democratic
'
culture."97
If identifying a trend is the first step toward reversing it, then
Connolly has rendered a valuable service. However, he only fleetingly
suggests ways to implement his ideas.9"
Discussions on contentious subjects, such as the death penalty, are
probably most effective when they are personal. Thus, to explain the artificial
construct behind capital punishment, abolitionists should use everyday
examples to which their listeners can readily relate.99 For example, in talking
about free will or proportionality of punishment one could use a mundane
commercial transaction that goes awry-such as the misdelivery of the
morning newspaper-as the starting point, and explore the impact of free will
(such as the individual decisions of everyone involved in producing the
newspaper) or proportionality of punishment (that is, adjusting the monthly
bill to account for the misdelivery) on that event. From there one could segue
into how contingencies affected the commercial transaction and then to how
the capital litigation process and often public discussion of it do not
adequately account for life's vagaries.
Beyond Intention: A Critique of the "Normal" Criminal Agency,
Responsibility, andPunishmentin American Death PenaltyJurisprudenceby
Jennifer L. Culbert, a visiting assistant professor of Justice Studies at Arizona
State University, comments on the elusiveness of formal legal prerequisites

95.
96.

Id.at 204.
Id.

97. Id.
98. The whole of Connolly's suggestion is:
Isuppose that Nietzsche can help on the first front (of teaching each other how to translate
existential dimensions of resentment] while thinkers like Arendt and Foucault might help
on the second [of joining political movements that address economic, educational and
social circumstances that encourage many to resent their present situation ina democratic
culture]. The problem, for starters, is that few of us are now prepared to show how each
front is entangled in the other and not too many are prepared to listen even if we made
progress in the diagnosis. But it remains important to keep trying.
Id. at 205 n.21. I partially agree with Connolly that familiar critiques of capital punishment
are insufficient. In Part VIII, I offer a few suggestions on how abolitionist lawyers can create
a legal climate accepting of abolition. In reality, the abolitionist movement has insufficiently
courted every constituency that may oppose the death penalty.
99. The law school so-called Socratic method of classroom discussion and reasoning by
analogy are often useful measures for such discussions. Though that method values speculation
of discussants over the documentation of their claims. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 4, 45-50 (1998).
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for imposing a death sentence. °° She contends that the decision to impose a
death sentence hinges more on moral norms than on legal ones. 0' The
problem with moral norms guiding the legal contours of the death penalty,
according to her, is that judges are allowed to determine which conduct is
morally blameworthy or punishable.'0 2 Judges, as arbiters of the law, use the
"normal person"--an imaginary character-and impose liability on those who
violate the norms of this person.'0 3 Culbert notes that the fictive "normal
person" is an autonomous, rational, and self-determining individual who can
be held responsible for his or her voluntary acts." ° However, a criminal
defendant's "acts" are often not discrete, self-evident facts, but are products
0 5 to make her point.
of legal interpretation. Culbert uses Tison v. Arizona"
Tison involved the prosecution of two sons for an unplanned killing
committed by their father after they helped him escape from prison.'0 6 Tison
held that the sons could be sentenced to death because they participated in the
prison escape, even though they did not participate in the killing, intend that
the victims be killed, or inflict the fatal blows.'0 7 For Culbert, the Court did
not want to acknowledge that some criminal conduct is an accumulation of
small gestures and not pre-planned events.0 8 Nor did the Court want to admit
that normal persons might be unwitting perpetrators of heinous crimes. Thus,
Culbert writes, "a defendant may be sentenced to death because he acts
without anticipating or desiring the consequences of his actions and yet
otherwise is completely 'normal.' . . . Only through such subterfuge and

equivocation can the Court account for the fact that people participate in
violent crimes with no intention of doing harm without resorting to
psychological or medical accounts of human behavior."'" Culbert notes that
criminal law doctrine typically does not rely on psychology and psychiatry to
understand human behavior. In fact, relying on these disciples is usually
viewed as a threat to criminal jurisprudence because mental health experts
instead of juries may determine the defendant's criminal responsibility, and
the medical understanding of the "normal person" may displace the legal
one." 0 By ignoring the psychological basis for human behavior, Culbert
notes, death penalty law has become loosened from its sociological moorings.
Culbert's insights apply to all of criminal law. Like most of the law,
criminal law has a tendency to be self-defined and to ignore important
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
at 211.
481 U.S. 137 (1987).
Id.at 139-41.
Id.at 158.

108. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 212-16.

109. Id. at213.
110. Id.at214.
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historical, scientific, and empirical developments."' In fact, those intimately
familiar with all facets of the criminal law apparatus---either by study or by
work experience-are generally not invited to participate in formulating penal
policy." 2 Consequently, scientific, empirical, and, on occasion, even
anecdotal information usually does not inform either criminal law or capital
punishment doctrine. The disconnect among research, criminal law
doctrine, 3 and public policy is most exaggerated when penological issues are
presented to the public in, for instance, media reports.
The final essay," 4 The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment:
Responsibility and Representation in Dead Man Walking" 5 and Last
11l. Richard Posner has argued that since the last half of the Twentieth Century this
phenomena has changed. Now, the legal system and legal thought are more willing to embrace
other disciplines and ways of thinking and dealing with what are ostensibly legal problems. See
Richard A. Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline, 1962-1987, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 761, 767 (1987).
112. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? ThePeculiarPlaceofExperts in the
Current Debate About Crime and Justice,31 CRIM. L. BULL. 305 (1995). Of the many reasons
for the exclusion are that politicians tend to "emphasize selfish, shorter-ternm, and emotional
concerns in making policy decisions," id. at 315, whereas penological and legal experts tend to
favor "far-sighted, broad-minded, and rationalistic" approaches. Id. at 317; see also Sara Sun
Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political,Social Psychologicaland Other Nonlegal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)CriminalLaw, I BUFFALO CRIM. L.
REV. 23, 32 (1997) (exploring the impact of psychological factors, race, and politics in
formulating criminal law doctrine); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001) (exploring the criminal law making process and
proposing methods that might rein in its breath). One barrier is fading as some jurisdictions no
longer automatically exclude lawyers from jury service. See generally Michael P. Sullivan,
Annotation, Jury: Who is Lawyer orAttorney Disqualifiedor Exemptfrom Service, or Subject
to Challengefor Cause, 57 A.L.R. 4th 1260, 1261 (1987) (analyzing state and federal cases
where the courts have addressed whether an attorney or lawyer is disqualified or exempt from
jury service).
113. The law of insanity is the paradigmatic example. In this nation's history, four major
tests, or a variation thereof, have been used to determine if a defendant lacked criminal
responsibility for a crime. Each test was only adopted after great dissatisfaction with existing
law. Moreover, even though courts and legislatures thought the tests they adopted were
innovative, these tests for insanity were often based on outdated research. For a brief
description of these developments, see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66,71-75 (Nev. 2001); Graham
v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 538-44 (Tenn. 1977).
114. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 226.
115. In the movie DeadMan Walking, Matthew Poncelet and Carl Vitello, while under the
influence of drugs and alcohol, go into the woods. They happen upon a teenage couple kissing
in a parked car. Poncelet and Vitello sneak up on the couple and tell them they are security
guards. The couple follow their orders and get out of the car. The boyfriend is bound and
forced to watch Poncelet and Vitello repeatedly rape his girlfriend. Eventually, the boyfriend
is shot twice in the back of the head, and the girlfriend is stabbed numerous times in the upper
body and then shot twice in the back ofthe head. See DEAD MAN WALKING (Poly Gram Filmed
Entm't 1995).
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Dance,"' 6 is by Austin Sarat, the book's editor. It considers how condemned
inmates and the public are portrayed in two movies. After highlighting some
possible psychological and social roles that concepts of punishment and
responsibility play within the criminal law, Sarat notes that executions-the
implementation of the ultimate sentence-are conducted in semi-private
settings." 7 Consequently, what we know of executions "comes in the most
highly mediated way as a rumor, a report .... Or' 8it comes in images and
in popular culture.""

representations made available
In light of the disjunction between punishment, responsibility, and the
public's lack of direct connection to executions, Sarat proposes "to make a
particular intervention in scholarship about the death penalty, to turn away
from abstract, philosophical questions about the morality or legality of state
killing and narrow policy-relevant research toward an analysis of the cultural
life of capital punishment."" 9 While noting that the movies chosen are not
representative of the genre, Sarat selects films produced by major movie
studios in the United States in 1996: DeadMan Walking

°

andLast Dance.

He points out how both films repeatedly emphasize that the condemned main
characters--Cindy Liggitt in Last Danceand Matthew Poncelet in DeadMan
Walking-accept full responsibility for their crimes before they are
executed.'' Such an acceptance allows the audience to conclude that the
executions are appropriate. Sarat also notes: "The language of responsibility
directs attention away from the legal and political issues surrounding capital
punishment just as it refuses to accept structure, accident, or conspiracy as

116. In Last Dance, Cindy Liggitt kills two people with a crowbar during a burglary of
their home. Twelve years later, during a review of her case in the last few weeks before her
scheduled execution, an attorney hired by the clemency board becomes convinced that she
should not die. The attorney first persuades her to fight for her life, and he then tries to obtain
a stay of her execution. See LAST DANCE (Touchstone Pictures 1995).
117. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 229.
118.

Id.

119.
120.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Several commentators have considered the presentation of capital punishment issues

in Dead Man Walking. See David R. Dow, FictionalDocumentaries and Truthful Fictions:
The Death Penalty in Recent American Film, 17 CONST. COMMENT 511,513 (2000) (pointing

out that compared to documentaries, big budget films present more accurate representations of
death penalty issues, including portrayals of guilty defendants); Roberta M. Harding, Celluloid
Death: Cinematic Depictions of CapitalPunishment, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 1167, 1168 (1996)

(stating that DeadMan Walking is a superior example ofhandling ofcapital punishment issues);
Christopher J. Meade, Note, Reading Death Sentences: The NarrativeConstructionofCapital
Punishment,71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 760-61 (1996) (arguing that to address capital issues more
persuasively films should include guilty defendants, such as Dead Man Walking's Matthew
Poncelet); Carole Shapiro, Do or Die: Does Dead Man Walking Run?, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1143
(1996) (comparing the movie's representations with the book on which it was based and with
actual capital defendants).
121. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 232.
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justifications for actions."' 22
Both films place the audience in the position ofneutral observers-jurors,
if you will-who are to deliberate on whether the defendant deserves to be
executed. Like capital sentencing jurors, the audience is not to consider
whether death should be a permissible penal sanction, only whether it will be
imposed on this defendant. Again, similar to capital jurors, whose
understanding of the crime and the defendant are supposed to depend on the
work of the lawyers and their courtroom presentations, the movie audience's
perception of the defendant and the crime is subject to the director's
presentation and persuasion. According to Sarat, both films give the
impression that viewers have seen the crimes as they occurred and that they
see what actually happens during an execution.2 3 This perspective allows the
films to "domesticate the death penalty and allow us to believe that we can
know what the state does in our name, that we can measure the effects of
capital punishment and in that act precisely fix the balance of pains necessary
to make the punishment fit the crime.' 24 In this regard the movies mediate
between "conservative cultural politics"'25 and popular culture. Sarat further
observes that both movies emphasize that the main characters' situations are
the products of their own choices. 6 This cinematic device allows the filmmakers to ignore the social factors that contribute to crime, while presenting
both the capital crime for which the defendant is to be executed and the
execution itself as discrete events. 27 In short, according to Sarat, both movies
make the death penalty palatable and socially acceptable. 2 '
Sarat does not quite succeed in dealing with the "culture of capital
punishment" in his essay. While he acknowledges that cultural messages are
in "both 'high' and 'popular' culture iconography, in novels, televisions, and

122.

123.
124.

Id. at 239.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 246.

125. Though this term is never defined, Sarat is apparently referring to those who generally
advocate for aparticular type ofsocial and fiscal conservatism inlaw and society. See generally
JAMES DAVIsoN HUNTER, CULTURE WARs: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
126. THE KILING STATE, supra note 3, at 240.

127. Abolitionists generally express uncertainty that the defendant committed the crime.
This uncertainty, in turn, leads to arguments on whether innocents have been executed. Indeed,
at some point during their prosecution and appeals, the overwhelming majority of capital
defendants claim that they did not commit the capital offense. That claim may be made at the
initial arraignment or plea, during trial, or, most likely, post-conviction. In light of this nearly
inevitable claim and virtually unfettered prosecutorial discretion on how to construct and litigate
cases, some abolitionists essentially contend that we will never truly "know" the full
circumstances of particular crimes. Franklinv. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988), which held
that "residual doubt" regarding the defendant's guilt is not a constitutionally compelled
mitigating factor, frustrates this notion because it invites the capital sentencer to believe that
guilt has been conclusively established and to focus only on the sentence that it should impose.
128. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 248.
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film,' ' 129 Sarat limits his consideration to mass cultural commodities-movies,
television programs, books, and positive law, such as court decisions and
statutes. 3 This decision likely has a distorting influence on the "culture" that
is presented. The upper social classes produce these items, and these
commodities probably reflect upper social class norms. Similarly, these
"cultural" barometers are not as apt to represent the perspectives of persons
of color or more vanguard approaches, due to the lag time between the
creation of these commodities and the circumstances that prompted their
creation.' 3 '
In contrast, Professor Kenneth Nunn, in his law review article, The Trial
as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial CriminalProcess-A
Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposalfor Reform,'
does a more convincing job than Sarat of assessing both the influence of
societal views and cultural works on a criminal trial and the influence of
criminal trials on society. According to Nunn, it is a myth to believe that a
criminal trial pits two evenly matched adversaries, prosecution and defense,
in a battle to persuade the jury.' In reality, the prosecution has a distinct
advantage because popular culture-through the medium of

129. Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
130. No doubt some aspects of the United States' legal culture can be ascertained by
mining movies, television programs and advertisements, newspapers, books, and songs. See
Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory ofPopularCulture, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 527,547-563;
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, andPopularCulture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1587 (1989).

These sources might provide insights on the norms and ideals valued and promoted within the
United States. See generally TIMOTHY E. SCHEURER, BORN INTHE U.S.A.: THE MYTH OF
AMERICA IN POPULAR MUSIC FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1991) (analyzing various
myths present in songs popular in different periods of United States history).
Care should be taken, however, not to infer too generally from these artifacts. Some of the
materials are produced for entertainment or satire and have slight educational or historical value.
Accordingly, the chance that one may have sacrificed accuracy for dramatic or satirical impact,
should be kept in mind when using that material to discover the values of culture. The essayists
in The Killing State do not examine many cultural products. In fact, the essays in the
"Responsibility" section of the book, (section II) which most directly deals with cultural
representations, consider only a few movies, books, and songs, and make no suggestion that the
material reviewed is representative of what is produced in the United States.
13 1. Consider, for instance, the "perp walk," in which an arrestee is paraded in front of
news reporters. This practice is portrayed as a usual part ofpolice life in the television program
NYPD Blue, which premiered in September 1993. NYPD Blue (ABC 1993). The practice has
been going on in New York City at least since the 1940s. See Blaine Harden, Paradingof
Suspects is Evolving Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at B I. No court has held an officer
liable for performing a perp walk. See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that staged perp walk violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights but granting the
police officer qualified immunity for participating in the activity because the unlawfulness of
perp walk was not clearly established by 1994).
132. 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 743 (1995).
133.

Id. at 745.
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television-portrays life in the United States as much more violent than it
really is and portrays criminals "as one-dimensional demons to be feared and
destroyed."' 34 Nunn thus places his argument within the larger framework of
culture and cultural products, and he substantiates his claims.
As a whole, The KillingState tries to discuss the death penalty outside the
bounds of the law. This is not surprising because for abolitionists-which,
based on the general thrusts of each essay, seems to be the leaning of the
book's contributors-the law itself does not yet prohibit a state from
executing its own citizens. Consequently, a book on the death penalty that
considered only legal issues would be, in the mind of abolitionists, painfully
incomplete. While The Killing State does address more than the law of the
death penalty it misses its chance to be more persuasive as work of
scholarship. This is partly because it does not define and document its claims.
The following section addresses the book's theme.
Ill. THE METAPHOR OF VIOLENCE
A repeated theme throughout The Killing State, first advanced in the
introductory essay, is the "uneasy linkage between law and violence."' The
book, however, is not concerned with what is known as the "brutalization
effect" of capital punishment." 6 The brutalization effect theory is that with
each execution members of a society do not feel safer; instead they accept
violence as a way of addressing societal problems.' 37 Instead, The Killing
State views law as being entwined with violence. According to Sarat:
Law it seems cannot work its lethal will and ally itself with the killing state
while remaining aloof and unstained by the deeds themselves. As pervasive

and threatening as this alliance is, it is, nonetheless, difficult to understand
that relationship, or to know precisely what one is talking about when one
speaks about it. This difficulty arises because law is violent in many
ways-in the ways it uses language and in its representational practices, in

134. Id. at 770.
135. THlE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 6.
136. See generally William J.Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization:
What is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIUME & DELINQ. 453 (1980) (finding a "brutalizing
effect" resulting from executions).
137. Justice Brandeis once noted the potential impact of the government's conduct on
society:
[O]ur Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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the silencing of perspectives and the denial of experience, and in its
objectifying epistemology. It arises from the fact that linguistic,
representational violence of the law is inseparable from its literal, physical
violence.... Violence, as both a linguistic and physical phenomenon, as
fact and metaphor, is integral to the constitution of modem law. 38
Sarat thus seems to argue that despite its efforts to remain neutral, the law, in
authorizing capital punishment, will itself inevitably become violent. Sarat's
observation, however, is not limited to the law of capital punishment but
would seem to apply any time competing choices are present in the law. The
rejected choice or perspective is "silenced," and the experiences of those who
advocated that perspective are implicitly devalued.
Sarat would have been on firmer ground asserting that modem
constitutional law, as a linguistic enterprise, is integral to the legal support of
the death penalty.'3 9 That is, in this country, contemporary debates on the
death penalty usually include a reference to the constitutionality of the
punishment and to principles of morality. The language of the law of capital
punishment, however, is frequently neither clear nor decisive. For instance,
the present federal constitutional framework for capital punishment was
ushered in when the United States Supreme Court, in a less than ringing
endorsement, declared that the death penalty does not "invariably violate the
Constitution."'"
That understanding of the document is subject to
reinterpretation both as the Court's personnel changes 4' and sometimes when
the Justices themselves recant their prior views. 42 More generally,
characterizing the interpretation and application of law as "iolence" is either
an inapt metaphor or is an expectation of something-uniformity and
perfection-that the law, in general, and the death penalty, in particular, have
never been able to deliver. 43 So long as law remains a human endeavor, it is

138. THE KnLING STATE, supra note 3, at 6 (internal quotation marks and footnotes
omitted).
139. See, e.g., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in
Capital Cases, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2590, 2597-2600 (1996) (recognizing the limits of legal
language).
140. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (Stewart, J.) (plurality opinion).
141. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,829-30(1991) (suggesting that decisions
"decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents" are more likely to be overruled).
But see id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Power, not reason, is the new currency of this
Court's decisonmaking ....
Neither the law nor the facts supporting [the overruled cases]
underwent any change in the last four years. Only the personnel of this Court did.").
142. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring inpart) ("I will not, in this case or in
the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that a sentencer's discretion has been
unlawfully restricted.").
143. Many of the essayists in The Killing State apparently seek to impose the nearly
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unlikely ever to be either uniform or perfect.
Robert Cover's apparent influence can be seen throughout The Killing
State.' In some of his writings, Cover addressed the connection between
6
legal interpretation and violence. 4 5 In the article Nomos and Narrative,"'
Cover stated the now-obvious idea that the world in which we live-including
legal institutions and legal solutions-does not exist apart from our
conception of it. "'7 He argued that legal meaning is given context through the
filter of culture. 48 Law is a system of tensions, and the legal interpreter's task
is to link reality with an imagined alternative. "' Cover labeled this imagined
alternative a "nomos," or normative universe. 5 He maintained that "there is
a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the
impossible goal of uniformity on the law of death. Interestingly, though they come to opposite
conclusions, two groups generally advocate for absolute consistency in the death penalty:
abolitionists and supporters of amandatory death penalty. The vast majority ofthe law of death,
however, has occupied the middle ground-as have the Justices on the United States Supreme
Court and the majority of United States citizens. It is on this ground that the law of death has
been built.
144. A few of the essayists explicitly rely on Cover. For instance, in Tokens of Our
Esteem, Simon and Spaulding note that advocates of enactment of more aggravating
circumstances assert that legislating these circumstances is a valid way to fight crime because
the circumstances define the most culpable criminal defendants. According to Simon and
Spaulding, aggravating circumstances should remind us of Cover's observation that all law is
founded on the possibility of death and violence. THE KILLJNG STATE, supra note 3, at 99.
Similarly, Amsterdam's Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill cites to Cover (and others) in
observing how the Court's involvement in appeals of stays of executions does not distance the
Justices from the process of death, but, as Cover maintained, actually brings them closer to it.
Id. at 182 n. 13 1. Sarat in The CulturalLife of Capital Punishmentalso refers to this stay of
execution example. Id. at 243. Sarat's essay relies on Cover in invoking Michel Foucault's
assessment of public executions as a "manifestation of force," which reiterates Cover's claim
that law is used to subordinate anyone who challenges legal authority. Id. at 228 (quoting
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DIscIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 50 (Alan Sheriden
trans., 1977)).
145. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 1992). A disconcerting aspect of The Killing State is that it does not stand
on its own intellectual feet. One has to rely on sources outside of the book, which are frequently
not mentioned in the book, to understand it fully. For instance, like me, in a review of a
different book by Sarat, the reviewer relies on sources either alluded to or cited in the book yet
that are not fully explained in Sarat's work. See Timothy V. Kaufrnan-Osbom, Regulating
Death: Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, Ill YALE L.J. 681, 692-733 (2001)
(relying on the work of Max Weber, John Locke, and Michel Foucault in reviewing AUSTIN
SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION

(2001)).
146.
147.

97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
1d. at 4.

148.

Id. at 9, 11-44.

149.
150.

1d.at9.
Id.at4.
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organization of law as meaning."'' After outlining how various communities
defined their nomos, which sometimes contradicted the law, Cover maintained
that legal meaning could not exist without the exercise of "superior brute
force""' or "coercion. '
He then considered "the extent to which coercion is necessary to the
maintenance of minimum conditions for the creation of legal meaning in
autonomous interpretive communities."' 54 Cover-metaphorically-viewed
judges as having complementary and contradictory roles. He wrote:
Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they command,
judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the
jurispathic office. Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal
traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the
rest.
But judges are also people of peace. Among warring sects, each of
which wraps itself in the mantle of the law of its own, they assert a regulative
function that permits a life of law rather than violence. The range of
violence they could command (but generally do not) measures the range of
the peace and law they constitute.
The resistance of a community to the law of the judge, the community's
insistence upon living its own law or realizing its law within the larger social
world, raises the question of the judge's commitment to the violence of his
office. A community's acquiescence in or accommodation to the judge's
interpretation reinforces the herneneutic process offered by the judge and
extends, in one way or another, its social range. Confrontation, on the other
hand, challenges the judge's implicit claim to authoritative interpretation.'
Cover thus used violence as an allegory on the real-life consequences of legal
interpretation. Cover's description of legal interpretation should produce
prudence and humility in judges. Prudence should be exercised due to the
difficulty in reversing a given interpretation. Legal interpretation should also
be undertaken with humility in light of the significant
effects-including
56
death-that may flow from how the law is construed.1
Cover returned to this theme in Violence and the Word.' In that essay
he considered how legal interpretation is given meaning in the everyday
world.

151.
152.
153.

Id. at 18.
Id. at44.
Id. at 40.

154. Id. at44.
155. Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted).
156. See Charles Fried, Imprudence, 1992 SUP. CT. REv. 155, 172-94 (surveying the
evolution of death penalty habeas law developments from 1963 to 1992 and exploring which
federal judges might be faulted for their rulings in capital cases).
157. 95YALEL. J. 1601(1986).
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Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true in
several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and
as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his
life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which
has already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have
finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have
been torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither
legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood
apart from one another.' 58
According to him, law carries with it an implied use of force. Cover used the
death penalty as an example of the connection between legal interpretation
and the conduct authorized by that pronouncement. He noted that
in capital punishment the action or deed is extreme and irrevocable, there is
pressure placed on the word-the interpretation that establishes the legal
justification for the act. At the same time, the fact that capital punishment
constitutes the most plain, the most deliberate, and the most thoughtful
manifestation of legal interpretation as violence makes the imposition of the
sentence an especially powerful test of the faith and commitment of the
interpreters. Not even the facade of civility, where it exists, can obscure the
violence of a death sentence.
Capital cases, thus, disclose far more of the structure of judicial
interpretation than do other cases. Aiding this disclosure is the agonistic
character of law: The defendant and his counsel search for and exploit any
part of the structure that may work to their advantage. And they do so to an
extreme degree in a matter of life and death." 9
Cover went on to observe that, by itself, ajudge's interpretation is worthless.
A judge who wishes to transform her understanding into deed must, if
located on a trial court, attend to ensuring that her decision not be reversed.
If on an appellate court, she must attend to getting at least one other judge to
go along. It is commonplace that many "majority" opinions bear the scars
or marks of having been written primarily to keep the majority. Many a trial
court opinion bears the scars of having been written primarily to avoid
reversal. "
The Bonds of ConstitutionalInterpretation: Ofthe Word, the Deed, and
the Role 6 ' was Cover's final writing on the issue. Though it largely repeats
his earlier thoughts in Violence and the Word, Cover ends the article with:

158.
159.

Id. at 1601 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1622-23 (footnotes omitted).

160. Id. at 1627.
161. 20GA. L. REv. 815 (1986).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:391

In law to be an interpreter is to be a force, an actor who creates effects even
through or in the face of violence. To stop short of suffering or imposing
violence is to give law up to those who are willing to so act. The state is
organized to overcome scruple and fear. Its officials will so act. All others
are merely petitioners if they will not fight back. 62
Cover was not writing to denounce capital punishment. 63 Rather, he
used capital punishment as an example of the real-world consequences of
legal interpretation. In not advocating the abolition of capital punishment,
Cover is a more forceful critic of the death penalty,' especially when it
appears that the rule of law is being subverted in order to sustain the death
penalty. Cover's position seemed to be that if the death penalty is going to
exist, it should be administered according to the law and within its strictures
and not merely under the pretense of following the law.
I read Cover as offering a metaphor that when law is interpreted, the
interpreter relies as much on his or her perspective to interpret as on any other
tool. "Violence" occurs when an interpreter, who has the power to declare the
law, insists that his or her understanding or application of the law is either
certain, inevitable, or inescapable. The interpreter then rejects all contrary
interpretations or applications of the law as impermissible, even though the
alternative interpretations are equally plausible. This is "violence" because
the interpreter is allowed, by dint of his or her position in society, not only to
impose a disputable legal interpretation on others, but also to banish contrary
readings. In making these choices, interpreters have to be willing not only to
be criticized but also to stand behind their decisions.' 65 Understandably, the
162.
163.

Id. at 833 (emphasis in original).
Cover claimed, "I am not an abolitionist." Id. at 831.

164.. Mark Tushnet, Reflections on CapitalPunishment: One Side of an Uncompleted

Discussion, 7 J. L. & REUGION 21, 25-27 (1989). Cover's criticism is more powerful partly
because "he defined his position with respect to a particular society which already had a
commitment to the death penalty, rather than offering a general defense of capital punishment
applicable to all societies." Id. at 26.
As with most arguments, the participants' own moral virtues and the positions they take affect
the persuasiveness of their claims. See Jerry Frug, Argument as Character,40 STAN. L. REV.
869 (1988); Joseph William Singer, Persuasion,87 MICH. L. REV. 2442 (1989). In this regard,
Cover's essentially indifferent subscription to the death penalty gives the impression that, if
administrated properly, he would more fully endorse it. In contrast, abolitionists tend to accept
any and every reason to discard the sanction while pro-death penalty supporters sometime seem
willfully blind to the problems of administrating a fair and effective capital punishment system.
Thus, Cover's resistance to being an abolitionists was another distinctive feature of his critique.
In doing so, he took a position apparently at odds with his expected cultural world view.
165. Today, in capital cases, judges, unfortunately, should expect public denunciation for
any ruling that may be interpreted as favorable to a capital defendant. See Stephen B. Bright
& Patrick J.Keenan, Judgesand the PoliticsofDeath: DecidingBetweenthe Bill ofRights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 784-93 (1995). Despite this
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open-ended clauses of the federal and state constitutions and the not-always
precise wording of penal statutes might lead some to think that "violence" is
occasionally being wrought by judges in capital cases.
Cover's metaphor is also somewhat misleading. First, it is not inevitable
that the law of capital punishment will result in death. In most capital
prosecutions, the defendant receives a sentence other than death. Second,
even when the defendant is sentenced to death, it is statistically unlikely that
the defendant will be executed, as only a small percentage of condemned
inmates are actually executed. Thus, it is the rare capital case in which a
defendant meets with "violence" (i.e., his death) through the law. It is only
in these relatively few capital cases that Cover's metaphor and assertion-that
capital cases are "the most plain, the most deliberate, and the most thoughtful
manifestation of legal interpretation as violence" 16 6-might apply. Third,
though the law of capital punishment outlines the circumstances under which
a defendant can be executed, 67 the law also says when a defendant cannot be
executed.' Consequently, to say that the law of capital punishment "results

recognition, judicial rulings in capital cases should be based on the law and not external factors,
such as the political palatability or popularity of a ruling.
In the United States, ajudge does not often face physical violence or death for his or her court
rulings, though a few have been killed. See Lee May & Ronald J. Ostrow, FederalJudges
Warned About Postal Bombs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at Al (describing the murder of
federal circuit Judge Robert Vance by mail bomb, the murder of federal district Judge Richard
Daronco by the angry father of a former litigant, and the murder of federal district Judge John
Wood, Jr., who was killed in his home by a sniper carrying out a contract "hit"). Physical
resistance and possible violence are more likely when enforcing highly contentious legal
decrees. See David Rosenzweig, On the Law: A Wake-Up Callfor L.A. County'sJudges,L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2002, at B2.
166. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1622 (1986).
167. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming that defendants who one
at least sixteen years old at the time of the capital offense can be executed); Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (stating that defendant who is recklessly indifferent to the likelihood
ofdeath and who is a major participant in a deadly felony can receive the death sentence); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-76 (1976) (affirming the death sentence and upholding a capital
punishment statutory scheme that limited imposition of the death sentence to five types of
murder and which provided for the sentencer to consider mitigating evidence when deciding the
sentence); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 246-53 (1976) (affirming the death sentence and
upholding a capital punishment statutory scheme that limited imposition of the death sentence
to first-degree murder and under which the trial judge had to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in determining whether to impose a death sentence); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976) (affirming the death sentence and upholding a capital punishment statutory scheme
under which the jury had to find that at least one often aggravating circumstances outweighed
any mitigating circumstances before imposing the death sentence).
168. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the
execution of mentally retarded defendants); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (affirming that execution of defendants who are under sixteen years old at
the time of the capital offense is unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410
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in" or "causes" violence or death ignores the law's protective power.
IV. TAKING COVER ELSEWHERE

The essayists in The Killing State apparently have a different
understanding of Cover's metaphor, and in light of the import of his writings,
Cover would likely agree that the essayists have a right to interpret his work
differently than I do. They presumably believe that the law is most "violent"
when it is interpreted to allow state-sanctioned executions. Put more bluntly,
the state can never, as a criminal sanction, execute one if its citizens. If one
maintains that executions are never permissible, then most efforts to justify
the legitimacy of the death penalty will be futile. Cover, of course, sought to
explain the law, including the death penalty, through the metaphor of
violence. It is an overstatement, however, to say that legal interpretation--or
the enforcement of legal decrees-is violence or foments violence. Nor does
the metaphor of violence always apply even when the underlying law deals
with matters of life and death, such as the regulation of funeral homes, wills,
abortion, the law of homicide or the death penalty, and when the enforcement
of the law will result in a human's death. Though creative and consistently
presented, the thesis of The Killing State-thatthe present interpretation and
application of laws related to capital punishment is legally sanctioned
violence that itself denigrates the culture, politics, and laws of a society-is
not established.
Even if one concedes that state-sanctioned, non-consensual executions are
legally- authorized violence, such executions will not invariably denigrate a
culture. In fact, Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have considered the
link between mass media depictions of aggressive acts of violence and real
world incidents of serious violence in the United States."6 9 After reviewing
the research and data of several behavioral scientists, Ziniring and Hawkins
concluded that proof of a link does not exist between media depictions of
aggressive acts of violence and real world incidents of serious violence. 7 ' If
the link between criminal violence in a society and its impact on either an
individual or a society has not been substantiated, then it is difficult to
conceive how the interpretation of legal texts and the authorization of
(1986) (stating that execution of the insane is unconstitutional); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982) (stating that the death penalty cannot be imposed on a felony murder
participant who did not kill, attempt to kill, intend that a killing take place, or intend to use
lethal force); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding
unconstitutional the death penalty for rape of an adult woman).
169. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME isNOT THE
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 124-37 (1997).

170. See id.at 132-37, 237-47. Zimring and Hawkins did not completely rule out the
possibility of some impact that deceptions of violence might have on a society and on
individual, as they noted that "we may lack the capacity to measure significant dimensions of
the pervasive influence of mass media communications." Id. at 137.
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particular punishment foments violence in a society.
Despite the lack of a demonstrated causal link between legal interpretation
and physical violence, one cannot deny that a somewhat paradoxical
relationship exists between the death penalty and other social phenomena. For
instance, there is a cylindrical connection between the death penalty, planned
killings, and messages that executions send about the value of life. Some
capital punishment supporters claim that a benefit of the death penalty is that
it reduces the likelihood of murders by eliminating those who have previously
committed that crime. In most instances, the intentional taking of a human
life is itself a crime. An exception is when the state-to show how much it
values human life--deliberately kills a murderer. Thus, the state's killing of
a murderer signals that violence and killing are sometimes an appropriate
means of resolving disputes. Executions may, in turn, devalue human life.
This devaluing of human life can lead to more individuals deciding to murder,
and those murders may be prosecuted as capital crimes.
Another contradictory social phenomena is the connection between the
death penalty and self-help. The desire for self-help has been identified as a
*practical justification for the death penalty. 7' Survivors ofmurder victims are
not to take private vengeance on the murderer. They are instead supposed to
rely on the court system for justice. At the sentencing hearing, however, a
state can allow survivors to tell of the emotional toll that the murder has had
on their lives and expect the sentencer to consider that toll when selecting the
sentence. Consequently, by allowing the victim's survivors to more directly
influence the sentence imposed, capital punishment law now places its
imprimatur on vengeance. In contrast, Gregg emphasized more the
elimination of emotion from the decision to impose the death penalty.'72
In short, Cover, in essays on legal interpretation, used a metaphor in
discussing the death penalty to highlight possible consequences of legal
interpretation. The Killing State uses Cover's metaphor to argue that
maintaining the death penalty bringsabout legal, political, and cultural decay,
but most of its essays over-emphasize that rhetorical possibility and come up
short in demonstrating the present extent of such decay. As they failed to
make evident the present decay, it is then not really surprising that the
essayists did not go on to suggest how legal, political, and cultural
components of United States society might be further impacted by continued
decay. It is likely, therefore, that only through imagining a dimmer future that
some will reconsider the role of capital punishment in the United States.

17 1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (plurality opinion) (suggesting
that capital punishment promotes social stability because the governed will believe that
offenders will get theirjust deserts and the governed will therefore renounce self-help, vigilante
justice, and lynch law).
172. See id. at 195 ("[T]he concerns expressed in Furmanthat the penalty of death not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.").
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V. DEATH PENALTY'S INFLUENCE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW

The essayists in The Killing State assert that the law-particularly the
federal Constitution-is being interpreted to legally sanction executions,
which makes executions more likely to occur than if the law were properly
interpreted to prohibit executions. This assertion is a half-told tale. In reality,
in this nation, the death penalty has been influencing the path of the criminal
law and criminal procedure for more than a century, and the United States
Supreme Court has been a leading actor in the process.
Since the end of the Civil War, the Court has expansively interpreted the
availability of habeas corpus, particularly in capital cases."" Initially the
Court expanded the scope of the writ under the guise of considering whether
the trial court had jurisdiction to prosecute; if the trial court lacked
jurisdiction, the writ was granted. 7 4 Though likely influenced by institutional
considerations, such as the availability of a federal forum in which the
defendant could litigate federal constitutional claims, for the greater part of
the Twentieth Century the Court seemed to have special solicitude for capital
habeas petitioners.
It appears that concerns about both racist state officials and the death
penalty motivated the United States Supreme Court to rework portions of
habeas corpus law. During the first half of the Twentieth Century, "' when the
criminal litigation process was less governed by federal constitutional
restrictions, the Court exhibited occasional concern about the fate of racial
minorities in the South.'76 Prisoners increasingly sought relief from their
criminal convictions in the federal courts via the writ of habeas corpus.
In brief, the federal habeas corpus statute permits federal courts to
entertain a habeas petition on behalf of a state petitioner "only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

173. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038,
1045-55 (1970) (discussing how the concept of federal habeas jurisdiction changed from 1873
to 1942); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465- 99 (1963) (reviewing the history and interpretation of
federal habeas review of federal and state court convictions from 1789 to 1952).
174. See Developments in the Law, supra note 173, at 1046-50.
175. The full story of the intersection of race and federal habeas corpus has yet to be told,

but there are some preliminary sketches of related issues. See MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY
PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED
100 YEARS OF FEDERAISM 175-76, 193-94 (1999) (asserting that the United States Supreme

Court's criminal procedure decisions in 1920s and 1930s evidenced a sensitivity to plight of
African-Americans in southern courts); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 48-49 (2000) (same).
176. Despite his general belief in limited federal habeas review, one influential
commentator allowed that federal habeas law should be able to address racism in the state court
criminal process. See Bator, supra note 173, at 521-25.
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United States.""' Thus, state prisoners have to establish that their continued
detention violates federal law in order to receive relief from a federal court.
In1923, for instance, the Court in Moore v. Dempsey' reinstated a federal
habeas petition brought on behalf of five African-Americans who had been
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in Arkansas. 79 The
defendants alleged that mob rule dominated their pretrial and trial
proceedings, resulting in a denial of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law.' ° The Court, citing and purporting to rely on Frank v.
Magnum,'' reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition."2 The case
was remanded to the district judge with instructions for him to perform his
"duty of examining the facts for himself," because the facts, as alleged in the
habeas petition, if true, would void the underlying trial."8 3 Commentators
have stated that Moore "carr[ied] the law beyond Frank" by "radically, albeit
quietly, alter[ing] the federal habeas jurisdiction."'8 4 In any event, Moore is
rightly viewed as an important case in the development of federal habeas law
because it authorized the federal courts to more closely review the state court
criminal process.
Another historic case, Brown v. Allen,' in 1953, consisted of three
consolidated cases from North Carolina, all involving African-American men
as defendants. Two defendants, Clyde Brown and Raleigh Speller, were tried
and convicted separately of different rapes of white women and both received
death sentences.' 86 Two other defendants, Bennie Daniels and Lloyd Ray
Daniels, were tried together, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death.'87

177. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000). Though phrased differently, similar language has existed
in the federal habeas statute since its original enactment. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1,

14 Stat. 385.
178. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
179. Id. at 92.
180.

1d. at 90.

181. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). In Frank, the Court rejected a claim that the defendant's due
process rights were violated because his trial was dominated by mob rule. However, the pages
of history support the defendant's claim. See generally LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO
FRANK CASE (1966).

182.

Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91.

183. Id. at 90-92.
184. Developments in the Law, supranote 173, at 1052, 1053. But see Eric M. Freedman,
Milestones in Habeas Corpus-PartII: Leo FrankLives: Untanglingthe HistoricalRoots of
MeaningfulFederal HabeasCorpusReview of State Convictions,51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1472
(2000) (contending that Frankand Moore are consistent and allow for extensive federal habeas
review of state court convictions and proffering that the cases had different outcomes because
of "no more than differing discretionary determinations in specific factual settings").
185. 344 U.S. 443,447 (1953).
186. Id. at 466, 477. Justice Black noted the race of the rape victims. Id. at 548 (Black,
J., dissenting).
187. Id. at482.
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On appeal, all four alleged federal constitutional violations. More
specifically, they claimed that the North Carolina courts had a practice of
excluding African-Americans from grand and petit jury service in violation
of the Sixth Amendment and that their confessions were coerced in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'8 8
The United States Supreme Court, in three splintered opinions, affirmed
the denial of each defendant's habeas petition. In the process, the Court
announced important interrelated rulings on federal habeas corpus law.
Brown established that all federal constitutional questions raised in a habeas
petition were cognizable on federal habeas review, even when the United
States Supreme Court had earlier denied certiorari on the same questions in
the case on direct review.18 9 Thus, after Brown, a state court's adjudication
of federal legal issues is not binding on the federal habeas court. 9 ' Brown
also determined that federal habeas courts were not bound by the state court's
factual findings and had the discretion to hold hearings. 9'
The Court was also protective of capital defendants in their direct appeals.
In 1932, in a capital prosecution that originated in the South, the Court
recognized an indigent defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 92 It took
another thirty years before the Court held that non-capital indigent defendants
had a right to counsel.'9 3 The practice of presuming prejudice when an
unrepresented defendant entered a guilty plea was first developed in capital
cases. 9 Thus, in the first half of the Twentieth Century, the Court typically
expanded constitutional protections for all criminal defendants when death

188. Id. at 467-76 (describing and rejecting Brown's claims); id. at 477-82 (describing and
rejecting Speller's claims); id. at 482-87 (describing and rejecting the Daniels' claims).
189. Id. at 487-88 (statement of Justices Burton and Clark); id. at 496-97 (opinion of
Justice Frankfurter); id. at 513 (statement of Justices Black and Douglas).
190. Id. at 459; id. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 464-65. Two other important decisions that expansively interpreted the
availability ofthe writ of habeas corpus were also capital cases, Fay v.Noia, 372 U.S. 391,438
(1963), which held that a state prisoner must have deliberately bypassed a state court process
to bar federal habeas review of the claim, and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963),
which detailed when federal habeas court should convene a hearing to help adjudicate the
petition. The Court's indulgence of capital defendants was explicit inFay, in which the Court
excused the defendant's failure to appeal his conviction, reasoning that he faced a "grisly choice
whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which,
if successful, might well have led to a retrial and death sentence." Fay, 372 U.S. at 440.
192. Powell v.Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,72-73 (1932) (holding that indigent defendants have
a due process right to assistance of counsel in capital cases); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that indigent defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in federal prosecutions).
193. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,339-45 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants
have a Sixth Amendment right to appointment of counsel).
194. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
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was a possible sentence. 9 '
In the second half of the Twentieth Century some Justices acknowledged
that a death sentence influenced their decision-making. Justice Jackson wrote
in a capital case: "When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are
tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to
give a doubtfully condemned man another chance.' 96 A few years later,
Justice Harlan, concurring in the Court's judgment granting habeas relief in
two capital prosecutions, wrote:
So far as capital cases are concerned, I think they stand on quite a different
footing than other offenses. In such cases the law is especially sensitive to
demands for that procedural fairness which inheres in a civilian trial where
the judge and trier of fact are not responsive to the command of the
convening authority. I do not concede that whatever process is "due" an
offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the
requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no
means197novel... nor is it negligible, being literally that between life and
death.

By 1977, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence incorporated this
sentiment of demanding more in capital cases than in non-capital cases, under
the general concept that "death is [] different."1 98 Thus, for the first three

195. Notwithstanding the Court's holdings, not every criminal defendant benefitted from
the Court's largess. One of the many reasons for this is that there is often a gap between United
States Supreme Court pronouncements and the actual operation of the criminal litigation
process. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, in
IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 67 (Theodore L. Becker &
Malcolm M. Feeleyeds., 2d ed. 1973) ("The Supreme Court typically formulates general policy.

Lower courts apply that policy, and working in its interstices, inferior judges may materially
modify the High Court's determinations."); Kenneth N. Vines, FederalDistrictJudges and
Race Relations Cases in the South, in IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL
STUDIES 81 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973) (considering race

relations cases decided inthe federal district courts in the traditional Southern states from May
1954 to October 1962 and noting that "[a]pparently precedent alone, even from the U.S.
Supreme Court, does not dictate the direction of the disposition of cases inthe district courts").
196. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953). Later that decade, Justice Jackson
reportedly said that the death penalty "completely bitches up the criminal law," by which he
apparently meant "not only that it unnecessarily multiplied trials and appeals but that the entire
judicial process was sentimentalized and sensationalized by injection of life-and-death

questions."

MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 22 (1973).

197. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Jackson, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
198. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,357 (1977) (pluralityopinion) (noting that
five members of the Court had "now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of
punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country").
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quarters of the Twentieth Century the Court's rulings in criminal cases
generally expanded the rights of capital defendants.
Since the late 1980s, however, the Court has exhibited considerably less
concern about capital defendants, both on direct appeal and on habeas review.
In fact, the Court has used capital cases to limit federal habeas court review
in all types of cases.' 99 The Killing State alludes to only this latter story,
without mentioning the previous history. It thus presents an incomplete
historical picture. Moreover, if one were concerned that judicial views on the
death penalty inappropriately influenced habeas decisions, then comfort may
be found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),2° a law that, for the first time in history, imposed different rules
for capital habeas cases from those for noncapital habeas cases. 20 The
AEDPA is apt to be a mixed blessing for both abolitionists and supporters of
capital punishment. One the one hand, the law promises a quicker
adjudication of capital habeas cases and more defense resources for capital
defendants to litigate their cases. On the other hand, its more arduous
procedural requirements in capital cases may not allow courts to resolve
capital habeas cases accurately. To be sure, the only objective that law
promises is "justice." To the extent that the death penalty remains lawful,
however, "justice" means neither that every death sentence should be
overturned nor
that the path to execution should be streamlined
20 2
unnecessarily.
199. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,470(1991); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
529 (1986).
200. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C. (2000)).
201. Among other things, the AEDPA established a statute of limitation for the filing of
state capital habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2002). It proposed an accelerated
schedule for the disposition of state capital cases if the prosecuting state has a mechanism for
the appointment, payment, and certification of competent counsel in its post-conviction
proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-65 (2000). The law also imposed conditions on appeals
by habeas petitioners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000).
202. The federal courts have thus far been able to avoid several looming constitutional
questions. One such issue is whether the AEDPA effectively suspends the writ of habeas corpus
for capital defendants, in violation of the Suspension Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see
Felker v. Turpin, 518 US. 651, 661-62 (1996) (ruling that the AEDPA's limits on availability
ofthe habeas writ were constitutional and that AEDPA did not abolish prisoner's ability to file
for habeas relief directly from the United States Supreme Court).
Scholars have already begun to lay the groundwork for challenging the constitutionality of
such processes. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I-Just
Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory
Prohibitionon the FederalWrit of Habeas CorpusforState Prisonersin the JudiciaryAct of

1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 534-37 (2000) (stating that constriction of the habeas corpus right
"risks offending" the Suspension Clause of the United State Constitution); Jordan Steiker,
Incorporatingthe Suspension Clause: Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Federal Habeas
Corpusfor State Prisoners?,92 MIcH. L. REV. 862, 863 (1994) (arguing that the claim of a
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VI. CULTURE AND THE DEATH PENALTY

While essentially packaged as a law and society book on the death
penalty, 23 most of the essays in The Killing State fall short of engaging in a
meaningful consideration of law, politics, and culture in the United States.
The Killing State tries to assess the cultural impact of capital punishment

without considering either the cultural expressions of groups that are most
directly affected by the death penalty or the apparent dominant perspective of
those regions of the United States that most frequently invoke the death
penalty. In short, the essays fail to define culture so as to provide context for
their assertions regarding the effects of the death penalty on culture.
The Killing State does not define the culture that it claims is corrosively
impacted by the death penalty.2° Two cultural studies scholars have noted

constitutional right to habeas corpus is supported by the history, text, doctrine, and structure of
the United States Constitution); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:
Successive Problems in CapitalFederalHabeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 699
(2002) (stating that the AEDPA has "undermine[d] reliability and fairness").

When the substantive limitations and time periods provided by the AEDPA begin to take
effect-preventing capital habeas defendants from filing either an original petition or an
application for a successive habeas petition-and it is apparent that defendants were never able
to litigate meritorious federal claims, federal courts will have to confront the validity of such
practices. One practitioner who is also a professor says that the AEDPA has prevented the
Court from adjudicating, among other issues, the constitutionality of the execution methods.
See Stevenson, supra, at 756-57. The operation of the AEDPA might provide the Court with
the occasion to address whether the Suspension Clause is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Again, commentators have sketched the broad outlines of that argument. See,
e.g., AKHILREEDAmARTHE BaLOFRIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 175-76 (1998);
2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION INTHE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1129 (1953); Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the

Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 103-04 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, Further
Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 120 (1982).
203. See THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 9. The book jacket states that the book is

"[e]dited by a leading figure in socio-legal studies." On that jacket, David Garland of New
York University proclaims that, "the culture of lethal violence that produces America's
astonishing level of homicides is now routinely reinforced by its rituals of state execution. This
serious, thoughtful, innovative book provides us with the means to diagnose that culture and
to explore the social roots of this modem tragedy."
204. Sarat might have thought that any definition would be worthless. He would share
company with a leading cultural theorist who wrote, "[i]t is notorious that definitions establish
nothing, in themselves they do, if they are carefully enough constructed, provide a useful
orientation, or reorientation, of thought, such that an extended unpacking of them can be an
effective way of developing and controlling a novel line of inquiry." CLIFFoRD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 90 (1973). Another leading theorist writes:

Culture it is argued, is not so much a set of things-novels and paintings or TV
programmes and comics-as a process, a set ofpractices. Primarily, culture is concerned
with the production and the exchange of meanings-the 'giving and taking of
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meaning'-between the members of a society or group. To say that two people belong to
the same culture is to say that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can
express themselves, their thoughts and feelings about the world, in ways which will be
understood by each other. Thus culture depends on its participants interpreting
meaningfully what is happening around them, and 'making sense' of the world, in broadly
similar ways.
Stuart Hall, Introduction,in REPRESENTATION: CULTURALREPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING
PRACTICES 2 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997).
Sarat, in a subsequent co-authored work, claims that "despite the growing sense that culture
must be recognized, there is little consensus on what the boundaries of the cultural are, let alone
how to 'read' it in any particular instance." Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal
Realism?: CulturalAnalysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 3,3 (2001). Even though they eschew proffering a definition of culture,
Sarat and Simon claim that cultural study of the law is important. Id. at 21. Other books that
Sarat has edited similarly suggest a cultural study of the law, but the reader is not told whose
culture is being studied. See, e.g., CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999) (including essays analyzing culture and law);
LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE I (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998) (noting the
importance of culture in law); RACE, LAW AND CULTURE; REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V.BOARD OF
EDUCATION 3-5 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) (analyzing culture in the wake of Brown). Professor
Judy Comett, a colleague at the University of Tennessee, tells me that
a 'cultural' analysis... tries to provide a context for the object of analysis (whether a text
or a person or a phenomenon) that sets it within a certain time and place, and, as
appropriate, a certain race, class, occupation, belief system,.. . and also sets it against or
compares it to other manifestations of the same culture. This is done purely in order to
enrich our understanding of the object of analysis.
E-mail from Judy Cornett, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, to Dwight
Aarons, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee (Jan. 11, 2002) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review). As wonderfully instructive as this insight is, some indication of which
"culture" that is the focus of The KillingState would help in assessing the book's accuracy and
usefulness. For more on cultural analysis, see generally MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN
SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS (James Tully ed., 1988) (analyzing cultural theories of Skinner);
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973) (analyzing
various theories of culture).
The lack of a definition of culture and a description of the culture under study seems to be
prevalent in the so-called cultural study of the law. For instance, in The PerverseLaw of Child
Pornography,Amy Adler purports to study "how censorship law responds to and shapes a
cultural crisis." 101 COLUM. L. REv. 209, 211 (2001). Though she does not define the culture
about which she writes, Adler acknowledges the contested nature of the term and concept of
"culture." Id. at 214 n.20. She notes that the connection between use ofchild pornography and
child molestation is "uncertain," including that no known documentation exists evidencing
those who possess child pornography but who are not child molesters. Id. at 216 n.32.
Ultimately, Adler says that she cares less about the frequency of child abuse than about the
"charged cultural preoccupation" on the subject. Id. at 217 n.35. My criticism of Adler is not
tojustify child pornography or child molestation but to show how cultural studies ofthe law are
actually more speculative than they first appear and how they are filled with normative views
of society, which are rarely acknowledged explicitly. This "perspectivelessness" most often
means that the "dominant culture"--white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, male-is being studied
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that there are two common meanings given to "culture":
The first refers to artistic output, defined and valued by aesthetic criteria and
emerging from a community of creative people. The second meaning takes
culture to be an all-encompassing concept about how we live our lives,,the
senses of place and person that make us human. These two definitions
intertwine: the cultural human
subject is both practical/sensual/active and
20 5
theoretical/spiritual/judging.

Anthropologists have defined culture as the "beliefs and perceptions, values
and norms, customs and behaviors of a group or society."2" Often the "group
or society" in question is identifiable either geographically or through the
sharing of ethnicity, language, religion, history, or other social factors." 7 In
addition, the collective values of the "group" must be transmitted to successor
generations if the "group" is to maintain its identity.2"'
Based on what they mention, the essayists in The Killing State seem to
have adopted the more inclusive view of culture. The book's focus is largely
on the United States of America in the late Twentieth Century, though one
essay focuses on Argentina from 1976 to 19832" and another on France and
England in the Eighteenth Century.2 1° Thus, a logical inference is that the
"culture" considered in the book is that which exists in most of the late

and serves as the unwritten norm of evaluation. See generally Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
Foreword. Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, I I NAT'L BLACK L.J. I
(1988) (calling the dominant mode of cultural characteristics "perspectiveless"), reprintedin
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education,4 S. CAL. REv. L & WOMEN'S STuD. 33, 35, 44 (1994); see also infra note 220.
My calls for an explicit acknowledgment ofthe author's cultural "perspective" and for a more
inclusive definition of culture are consistent with the work of critical race theorists. As one
such scholar has noted, "culture is extremely important to critical race theory," and "cultural
analysis is contextual.... Critical race theory is based significantly on culture; its adherents
not only recognize this, we emphasize it .... [W]e reflect distinctively colored cultural
backgrounds, valuations, and frames and reference." John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2185, 2188 (1992).
205. TOBY MaLLER& ALEc MCHOUL, POPULAR CULTURE AND EVERYDAY LiFE 5-6(1998).
206. Jonathan Drimmer, HateProperty: A Substantive LimitationforAmerica's Cultural
Property Laws, 65 TENN. L. REV. 691, 698 (1998) (quoting IRWIN ALTMAN & MARTIN
CHEMERS, CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 3 (1980)).
207. Id. (citing Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
CulturalPropertyin the United States, 75 B.U.L. REV. 559,567 (1995); M. Catherine Vernon,
Note, Common CulturalProperty: The Searchfor Rights of ProtectiveIntervention, 26CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 435,446-46 (1994)).
208. Id. at 698-99.
209. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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Twentieth Century United States.2 ' Though the book is presented as a
cultural study of the death penalty, it does not fully capture the
multiculturalism (and pluralism) that currently exists within this country.2" 2
The cultural baseline of The Killing State may be most apparent in the
three essays of the final section of the book, which purports to explore the
death penalty's impact on culture. William Connolly, in The Will, Capital
Punishment, and Cultural War, imagines the capital trial as a contest. He
relies on Anglo-American history and criminal philosophy.213 He also cites
to Twentieth Century United States social science research, judicial opinions,
news reports, election campaigns, jury selection processes, and jury
21 4
deliberations reports to document his claim of what is "our culture." '
Connolly essentially contends that capital prosecutors are better able than
capital defenders to make the theory of their cases connect with prevailing
cultural norms.2" 5 Jennifer Culbert's Beyond Intention: A Critique of the
"Normal" Criminal Agency, Responsibility, and Punishment in American
Death Penalty Jurisprudencebasically argues that moral values instead of
legal principles guide the imposition of the death penalty. 6 She notes that
lawmakers and judges have resisted relying on social sciences and disciplines
such as psychology and psychiatry, despite the insights that these disciplines
can provide in helping to understand human behavior.2" 7 She offers little in
detailing the content of moral norms. Austin Sarat's The Cultural Life of
Capital Punishment: Responsibility and Representation in Dead Man
Walking and Last Dance draws meaning about how the death penalty is
understood from how it is presented in two mainstream movies. Sarat
perceives that an almost hidden conservative cultural politics is present that

211. Some Justices on the United States Supreme Court have suggested that the death
penalty's evolving standard of decency found in the Eighth Amendment should only draw its
meaning from "American conceptions," namely, practices within the United States of America.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.l (1989) (plurality opinion). If the Western
hemisphere has a cultural norm on the death penalty, it seems to be toward the abolition of the
death penalty and not the retention and expansion of capital punishment, which is occurring in
the United States. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-83 (1993) (discussing the history and enforcement of the interAmerican human rights system, which includes the Western hemishpere).
212. The cultures that exist within North America extend beyond the borders of its nationstates. See, e.g., JOEL GARREAU, THE NINE NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA (1981) (noting the
cultural and regional similarities of area within the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the
Carribean Islands that ignore the borders of each nation); Nancy Gibbs et al., The New Frontier,
A Whole New World, TIME, June 11, 2001, at 36 (noting that the United States and Mexico do
not stop at the geographic border).
213. THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 187-205.
214.
215.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 197.

216.

Id. at 206.

217.

Id.at 215.
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explains the guiding themes in both movies. Notably absent from these three
essays is evidence that might be fairly characterized as indicating the beliefs,
perceptions, values, norms, customs, or behaviors of a majority of people who
live in the United States. Missing, too, is an explanation of which culture or
subculture ought to be most influential in the operation of the death penalty.
Rather, The Killing State seems to offer a singular perspective-that of
white, liberal-establishment, Northeasterners." 8 This approach should not be
surprising, as Sarat, who fits that description, is the general editor and is also
the apparent intellectual organizer for the book. However, the death penalty
as administered in the Northeastern United States is manifestly different from
the way it is administered in other parts of the country, especially the South." 9
Thus, it is unlikely that this Northeastern perspective fully reflects the
diversity of attitudes in this nation on the death penalty. In fact, the
Northeastern United States has historically rebelled, with abolitionist
sensibilities, against some governmental policies, such as slavery and capital
punishment.220 Righteous indignation to the existence and administration of
the death penalty without a corresponding alternative suggestion for
eliminating the conditions that may give rise to capital offenses often makes
this theorizing seem like both hand-wringing and pronouncements that arepro
tanto brutumfulmen.22 ' This description is apt for The Killing State because
218. A similar observation has been made with regard to fundamental rights constitutional
jurisprudence. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REviEw58-59 (1980) (hypothesizing thatjudicial choice of fundamental values will favor upper
or middle class professionals).
219. CompareCharles S. Lanier, The Death Penalty in the Northeast, 10 CRIM. J. POL'Y
REV. 7 (1999) (reviewing death penalty in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania and examining four northeastem states without capital punishment:
Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont), with KEITH HARRIES & DERRAL
CHEATWOOD, THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXECUTION: THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT QUAGMIRE. IN

12-40 (1997) (exploring the historical and contemporary distribution of the death
penalty and execution rates in the United States).
220. For a brief glimpse into the lives of slavery abolitionists, see HENRY MAYER, ALLON
FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 260-84, 349-47 (1998).
Death penalty abolitionists can perhaps learn from the pages of history. The movement against
slavery began as a conservative lobbying effort, advocating gradual legal reform. As the
campaign became more inclusive, allowing African-American activists, female reformers, and
nonelite whites more influence and leadership positions, it evolved into a grassroots reform
movement. See RICHARD S. NEWMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM:
FIGHTING SLAVERY INTHE EARLY REPUB11C (2002) (detailing the anti-slavery movement from
the 1770s the to 1830s). For an overview of the distinctiveness of New England's regional
identity and how that identity has been culturally transmitted, see JOSEPH A. CONFORTI,
AMERICA

IMAGING NEW ENGLAND: EXPLORATIONS OF REGIONAL IDENTITY FROM THE PILGRIMS TO THE
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY (2001).
221. Pro tanto means "[fqor so much; for as much as may be; as far as it goes." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (6th ed. 1990). Brutumfulmen means "[a]n empty noise; an empty
threat." Id. at 194. Thus, arguments for abolition of capital punishment without corresponding
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it is long on condemnation of the death penalty, but it is short on penal and
moral alternatives.
A. Subcultures
Related to the apparent singular perspective of the book, another regret is
that The Killing State does not deal with subcultures2 22 or groups that exist
within the larger United States' culture but that have their own distinctive
values and norms.223 Two important subcultures are those most heavily
touched by capital punishment, namely the subcultures of young AfricanAmerican and Latino/Hispanic men, who are disproportionally overrepresented in capital prosecutions and on death row. The lives and culture
of these young men is likely far different from the lives and cultures of the
book's essayists. Therefore, mining the cultural work of these young men
would have given the essayists in The Killing State a more inclusive picture

social and penal alternatives are all sound and fury, signifying nothing.
In contrast, consider some reactions by minority scholars to McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987), which held that racially disproportionate capital sentencing does not violate either
the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendments. These scholars have advanced proposals that move
beyond judicial oversight of capital prosecutors. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND
THE LAW 340-50 (1997) (exploring judicial, legislative, and societal reforms that might change
the racial composition of death row); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97
YALE L.J. 420, 439-47 (1988) (stating that the socially constructed notion of "victim" should
be redefined); Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1424-43 (1988) (expressing concern for the
underprosecution of killers of blacks and proposing judicial remedies); Evan Tsen Lee &
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying ProsecutorialDiscrimination
Against
Black Victims in CapitalSentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145 (advocating awarding damages
to families of murder victims whose lives have been undervalued on the basis of race).
222. The term subculture describes "those special worlds of interest and identification that
set apart some individuals, groups, and/or larger aggregations from the larger societies to which
they belong." James F.Short, Jr., Subculture, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA 839
(Adam Kuper & Jessica Kuper eds., 1985). According to Miller and McHoul, a subculture is
"a fraction of a larger culture with its own practices, objects, and values (where these are often,
but not always, in opposition to the larger culture)." MILLER & MCHOUL, supra note 205, at
195. Another commentator says that a subculture involves "a baseline symmetry of perspectives
among participants, cumulatively stabilized and amplified by the back-and-forth flow of
meaning among them." ULF HANNERZ, CULTURAL COMPLEXITY: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF MEANING 70-71 (1992).
223. A leading authority on subcultures coined the term "contracultures" to describe the
contrary values sometimes adopted by subgroups. J. Milton Yinger, Contraculture and
Subculture, 25 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 625, 627 (1960). By end of the 1960s, the term had
evolved into "counterculture." Yinger defined the term as meaning a "set of norms and values
of a group that sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which that
group is a part." J.MILTON YINGER, COUNTERCULTURES: THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF A
WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 3 (1982).
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of the cultural impact of capital punishment and violence. 224 Not much would
have been required to do the mining. For instance, a rather "academic"
inquiry-perusing the shelves of a university library for books on rap and hiphop music-would have added some insight on the cultural perspective of
persons of color and the poor on issues of law enforcement.
1. Hip-Hop and Rap Music Subculture
Since the late 1970s, rap and hip-hop music has been one mode of
expression for largely African-American and Hispanic youth, 225 and it is now
probably their most widespread contemporary cultural expression.2 26 More
importantly, this music and these subcultures have infiltrated contemporary
media.227 Though rap and hip-hop music does not pretend to represent the
poor or capital criminals, 228 it does come closer to reflecting the attitude and
mindset of potential capital defendants than most other cultural art.229

224. Indeed, as a young black man, when answering questions after he had been charged
with inciting a riot, H. "Rap" (Hubert Geroid) Brown famously declared, "Violence is part of
America's culture. It is an American as cherry pie." John H. Averill, Rap Brown Denounces
Johnson as 'MadDog', L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1967, pt. 1, at 18. Years later, Brown explained
his choice of words, "We all heard about little George Washington and his ax cutting down the
cherry tree. Then he led this country in armed revolution, and it's been through wars ever since.
People ask me if I didn't mean 'apple pie.' No, George Washington and cherry pie." David
Kindres, At Large: Inman JamilAl-Amin has no regrets, ATL. J. CONST., Aug. 16, 1995, at 5C.
225. See generally DROPPIN' SCIENCE: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RAP Music AND HIP Hop
CULTURE (William Eric Perkins ed., 1996); NELSON GEORGE, Hip HOP AMERICA (1998); S.H.
FERNANDO JR., THE NEW BEATS: EXPLORING THE MUSIC, CULTURE, AND ATTITUDES OF HiP-

HoP (1994).
226. Movies and television programs are generally not as reflective of minority
experiences. In neither industry are a sufficient number of persons of color in decision-making
positions. Further, production costs for motion pictures and television shows are sufficiently
high that movies and television dramas are homogenized to attract the largest viewing audience,
which, in turn, allows them to be profitable.
227. See Christopher John Farley, Hip-Hop Nation: There's More to Rap Than Just
Rhythms and Rhymes, TIME, Feb. 8, 1999, at 54.
228. The thoughts of potential capital criminals are relevant to the extent that the death
penalty supposedly deters crime. See Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence,Death, and the Victims
of Crime: A Common Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REv. 587, 597 (1982) (reporting ofa 1970
and 1971 Los Angeles Police Department survey ofviolent crime arrestees, which reported that
half of the surveyed arresters said that they had not killed or had "deliberately... avoided
placing themselves in a position where they could have killed" because of fear of the death
penalty).
229. See Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by Nature: Black Male Joyriding-IsEverything
Gonna be Alright, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 84 & n.40 (1994) ("My claim is that rap, like
Black music before it, can provide context and meaning to the behavior of those who do not
accept the legitimacy of their own oppression.").
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Rap music often uses symbols of criminality and violence both
metaphorically and as descriptive narratives of life in the inner-city. There are
several genres of rap music, including message or political rap and "gangsta"
rap.2 30 "Gangsta" rap often glorifies criminal activity. 3' Police oppression

and brutality are common themes as well.232 It achieved its largest
commercial success in the 1980s. At that time, inner-city communities were
experiencing the economic and social dislocation wrought by the policies of
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.2 33 That dislocation was
partly caused by aggressive prosecutions of drug offenses and increased
penalties for drug-offenses. Though rap music is not a direct statement on the
death penalty,234 messages of abuse in rap music claim that not only are the

230. Despite its continued evolution, critics maintain that rap music depicts women in an
unflattering manner, and has too great of a focus on sex, violence, and materialism. More
recent criticism has come from some artists themselves who question the impact of the music's
images and messages on society. See Allison Samuels et al., Battle for the Soul of Hip-Hop,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 2000, at 58 (describing some criticism of rap music's representations by
hip-hop artists).
231. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992) (describing the tensions between AfricanAmerican communities, enforcement of the criminal law, and values).
232. Robin D.G. Kelley captures the many nuances ofgangsta rap and places the genre and
its creators in hstorical and sociological context. See Robin D.G. Kelley, Kickin' Reality,
Kickin' Ballistics: Gangsta Rap and PostindustrialLos Angeles, in DROPPIN' SCIENCE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RAP MuSIC AND HIP HOP CULTURE 117 (William Eric Perkins ed., 1996).
233. Rap music's more critical social commentaries on economic dislocation were written
during the Reagan-Bush years, 1980 to 1992. See, e.g., GRAND MASTER FLASH AND THE
FURIOUS FIVE, The Message, on ADVENTURES ON THE WHEELS OF STEEL (Sequel 1982).
234. For a notable rap commentary on the death penalty from the perspective of ajuvenile
on death row, see TUPAC SHAKUR, 16 on Death Row, on R U STILL DOWN? [REMEMBER ME]
(Interscope Records 1997). Though albums or song titles suggest otherwise there are few rap
songs that directly address capital punishment. Songs in other music genres, such as the bluesy
Strange Fruit also comment on the death penalty. Steve Earle has recorded several death
penalty related songs, and one of these is written from the perspective of a prisoner who is soon
to be executed. See STEVE EARLE, Billy Austin, on SHUT UP AND DIE LIKE AN AVIATOR
(Universal/MCA 1991). Another is written from the perspective of a guard on a strap down
team, see STEVE EARLE, Ellis Unit One, on DEAD MAN WALKING: MUSIC FROM AND INSPIRED
BY THE MOTION PICTUR (Sony Music Entm't 1995), and another was written by Earle after
witnessing the execution of his pen-pal Jonathan Nobles. See STEVE EARLE, Over Yonder
(Jonathan'sSong), on TRANSCENDENTAL BLUES (E Squared Records 2000). Phil Ochs has
written anti-death penalty songs as well. Ochs' Another Country from the chronicles various
human rights abuses that occur in other countries, including capital punishment, and makes the
satirical statement, "I know it couldn't happen here [America]." THE BROADSIDE TAPES 1
(Smithsonian Folkways 1989); see alsoPHILOCHS, Iron Lady, on IAIN'T MARCHING ANYMORE
(Hannibal 1965) (questioning the execution of Caryl Chessman); PHIL OCHS, Paul Crump, on
A TOAST To THOSE WHO ARE GONE (Rhino Records 1989) (regarding a former Illinois death
row inmate); PHIL OCHS, The Trial, on A TOAST To THOSE WHO ARE GONE (Rhino Records
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gatekeepers to the criminal litigation process-the police on the
*street-racists, but that the entire criminal litigation process is permeated with
racism, especially in the administration of the death penalty. 23 5 Message rap

1989) (alternating among a satirical criminal trial, a chorus and, the prisoner's subsequent
execution by firing squad). Two complete albums are comprised entirely with abolitionist
songs. See DEAD MAN WALKING: Music FROM AND INSPIRED BY THE MOTION PICTURE (Sony
Music Entm't. 1995); THE PINE VALLEY COSMONAUTS, nE EXECUTIONER'S LAST SONGS
(Bloodshot Records 2002).
235. The apparent indifference to racism in the criminal litigation process by the judicial
appointees of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush might be most poignantly
summarized by McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which by a 5-4 vote held that
imposing death sentences in a racially disproportionate manner does not violate either the
Fourteenth or Eighth Amendments. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 82-98 (1992) (discussing the Court's actions during the
McCleskey arguments); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE
THE REHNQUIST COURT 171-84 (1995) (same). One commentator has compared McCleskey to
both Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES,
May 1, 1987, at 5.
Others have suggested that the McCleskey majority was unable to empathize with black
murderers but was equally confident in its own perceptions of social reality, which may have
been based on stereotypes. Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-Blindness in the
Rehnquist Court: Comparing the Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by a Black
Death Row Inmate and White Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 815,
851-52(1996). Of course, the dissenters, especially Justice Brennan, wrote with empathy and
passion. Just as importantly, in his dissent, Justice Brennan documented his assertions to the
record before the Court. The empathetic beginning to Justice Brennan's dissent is worth
repeating, as he wrote:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer whether ajury
was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question would have been
disturbing. First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the crime
or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more important than the fact that his victim
was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants
charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to
death as defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the
disclosure that it was more likely than not that the race of McCleskey's victim would
determine whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every II defendants convicted of
killing a white person would not have received the death penalty if their victims had been
black, while, among defendants with aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to
McCleskey's, 20 of every 34 would not have been sentenced to die if their victims had
been black. Finally, the assessment would not be complete without the information that
cases involving black defendants and white victims are more likely to result in a death
sentence than cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant and victim. The
story could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential
narrative line: there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in
determining if he lived or died.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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or political rap music, on the other hand, often comments on society with a
black nationalist or progressive political bent.236 Discussing message rap, one
commentator stated:
No theme-be it education, family structure, poverty, teenage pregnancy,
incest, AIDS, crack cocaine, or alcoholism-is too sensitive for unreserved
public discussion.... Overall, the message tends to portray, in vivid and
urgent terms, the contours of existing social breakdown, and in the best of
cases may offer a vision of a new and more just way of life.237
Police abuse and misconduct are also targets of critique in message rap.
Unlike gangsta rap, message rap more frequently promotes political and social
consciousness, self-discipline, education, and control of a community by its
indigenous members as ways to cure social ills.23
2. The South: Its History and Subculture
The South is another subculture that is under-explored in The Killing
State. Since 1976, most of the states that have executed criminals are
southern states; these states also typically have large death row populations.

236. Message rap can be rightly viewed as a successor to the political ideas articulated and
advocated by groups such as the Black Panther Party, Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, and the Congress of Racial Equality. "There is little doubt, however, that black
nationalism had its most complete and sophisticated theoretical development, as well as its
greatest mass appeal, during the 1960s and early 1970s, when it was articulated as an alternative

worldview to integrationism and as part of a program of radical social transformation[.]" Gary
Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758,785-86 (citing inter alia H. RAP BROWN, DIE
NIGGER DIE! (1969); STOKLEY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN THE STRUGGLE: SNCC
AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s (198 1); ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968);
THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK (Philip Foner ed., 1970); HERBERT H. HAINES, BLACK RADICALS
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MAiNsTREAM: 1954-1970 (1988); GEORGE JACKSON, SOLEDAD BROTHER:
THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON (1970); G. MARINE, THE BLACK PANTHERS (1969);
HUEY NEWTON, To DIE FOR THE PEOPLE: THE WRITINGS OF HUEY P. NEWTON (1972); BOBBY
SEALE, SEIZE THE TIME: THE STORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND HUEY P. NEWTON

(1970); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (A. Haley ed., 1965)). More recent
writings convey the depth of black nationalist thought. See, e.g., ELAINE BROWN, A TASTE OF
POWER: A BLACK WOMAN'S STORY (1992); JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK
REVOLUTIONARIES (1972); DAVID HILLIARD & LEWIS COLE, THIS SIDE OF GLORY: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF DAVID HILLIARD AND THE STORY OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (1993);
HUGH PEARSON, THE SHADOW OF THE PANTHER: HUEY NEWTON AND THE PRICE OF BLACK

POWER IN AMERICA (1994).
237. Ernest Allen, Jr., Message Rap, in DROPPN' SCIENCE: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RAP
MUSIC AND HiP HOP CULTURE 159, 160 (William Eric Perkins ed., 1996).
238. For the uninitiated, Chuck D Presents Louder Than a Bomb (Rhino Entertainment
1999) contains a representative selection of message rap.
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To the extent that regional differences matter, one might wonder whether
southern history or southern culture fully accounts for that region's firm
embrace of the death penalty and what impact that history and culture have
today on the retention of the death penalty.
Traditionally, the South2 39 -Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia-has been viewed as valuing honor and tradition. From
this, some have inferred that southerners have a value system and behavior
patterns that make them more tolerant of violence and the use of force than
" ' an
others in the United States."4 The South has a distinctive history,24
important feature of which is racial domination of blacks by whites. Some of
the region's racial and cultural development was influenced by its agrarian
economy. In order to generate economies of scale sufficient for profitability,
farms and plantations had to be large, which, in turn, required a large number
of slaves. The size of plantations tended to isolate each farm and its workers
from outsiders. This isolation coupled with fear of insurgency fostered the
use of localized force, especially on each plantation.
Today, the South tends to be bound to custom, which results in its
resistance to social and cultural changes. It also has a great respect for
hierarchy and authority. Somewhat schizophrenically, Southerners respect
people in authority positions, such as governmental officials, but are generally
distrusting of the power that they wield. 4 Consequently, Southerners dislike
having governmental power exercised against them or their interests.

239. Even if viewed as only the former states of the Confederacy, the South is itself a
generalization; it is a diverse region with many subcultures, including, for instance, the
Appalachian section of Tennessee and Virginia, the Creole of Louisiana, and indigenous Native
American populations.
240. See RIcHARD E. NISBETT & Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 25-40 (1996); JOHN SHELTON REED, THE ENDURING SOUTH:
SUBCULTURAL PERSISTENCE IN MASS SOCIETY 45-56 (1972). Generalizations are inherently
imprecise. For observations on violence, the life of one white southern laborer, and the lives
of others within his class, see THECONFESSIONS OFEDWARD ISHAM: A POORWHITE LIFE OFTHE
OLD SOUTH (Charles C. Bolton & Scott P. Culclasure eds., 1998).
241. See JOHN B. BOLES, THE SOUTH THROUGH TIME: AHISTORYOFAN AMERICAN REGION
(1995); Drew Gilpin Faust, The Peculiar South Revisited, in INTERPRETING SOUTHERN
HISTORY: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SANFORD W. HIGGINBOTHAM 78-119 (John
B. Boles & Evelyn Thomas Nolen eds., 1987); FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS, A HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH (3d ed. 1963); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 3-39 (rev.
ed.

1968); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN,

SOUTH

242.

SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD

(1982).
These are my personal observations, but seem to be supported by research. See

ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:

THE COLLAPSE

AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN

COMMUNITY (2000); Janie Satterfield, Study gives an idea of what typical East Tennessean is
all about, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 1,2001, at A I (pointing out certain contradictory

behavior patterns of East Tennesseans).
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Southerners are generally socially and politically conservative and often view
governmental regulation as an unnecessary intervention and an attempt to
centralize power. Though these traits tend to set the South and Southerners
apart from the rest of the nation, they may not completely explain either the
pervasiveness or continuity of the death penalty in the South.
The South's legal legacy should also inform death penalty cultural
research. The death penalty has been legally sanctioned in the South since
each southern state entered the Union. Though southern legal history remains
largely under-explored, commentators have noted that many aspects of
southern law were affected by slavery and a culture of violence.243 Legal
authority was more localized than in other regions of the nation. Thus, the
prerogatives of local citizens typically prevailed in the judicial system. One
aspect of this localized justice was a particular form of executions-"lynch
law." 2" Whether at the hands of the Ku Klux Klan, from the mid-1 860s until
the mid-1870s, or through mob rule, from the mid-1870s through the mid1900s, lynchings were used to retain a social structure "in which every white
stood above all blacks" by targeting primarily "politically active or successful
African-Americans, northern carpetbaggers, and southern scalawags. '245
Generally, neither federal officials nor the federal courts provided relief. In
other words, lynching and "lynch law" were vernacular methods of
administering justice, which underscored the social control that some whites
exercised over the indigenous black population and anyone who was
sympathetic to former slaves. 2" Mob lynchings were most likely to occur
when southern whites felt threatened by blacks and when other cultural
factors, such as economic leverage and social ostracism, could not be used
quickly to assuage the perceived threat. 24" The criminal litigation process was
of little concern to the mob--"lynch mobs appear to have been impressively

243.

See James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism and the Legal History
A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 3 (David J.
Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law Between the
States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 30 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984); Paul
Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History,64 N.C. L. REV. 77,90 (1985); see also MARK
of the South, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY:

V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY

AND INTEREST (1981) (examining how slavery influenced the development of law).
244. Lynching's imprint on contemporary culture is reflected in Strange Fruit, a song
written by Lewis Allen and made famous by Billie Holliday, and in a 1944 novel of that name
by Lillian E. Smith. For more on the song, see DAVID MARGOLICK, STRANGE FRUIT: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF A SONG (2001).
245. STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930, at 14 (1992).

246.

See UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING INTHE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage

ed., 1997); TOLNAY & BECK, supra note 245; BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN
HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 435-40, 453-61 (1982).

247.

TOLNAY & BECK, supra note 245, at 81-82.
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insensitive to the vigor with which the state imposed the death penalty on
blacks" 4 -and the mob apparently knew that it could circumvent the formal
criminal litigation process by imposing instant vengeance on the suspected
offender with little fear of legal redress. By the mid-1900s, lynching had
largely ended because of a number of factors, including a comprehensive antilynching campaign,"" changes in southern economic conditions, and the
influence of outsiders' opinions on the practice.250
It is disappointing that none of the essayists in The Killing State draw
parallels between the extralegal historical lynchings and the possible impact
on the South of more recent legal developments. For example, in the past,
local southern law enforcement officials were ineffectual and at best
indifferent toward preventing lynchings. More recently, Congress has been
seemingly indifferent to the foreseeable consequences of some statutes it has
enacted, notably eliminating federal funding of capital defender programs and
the AEDPA.25' Well-reasoned and extensively documented research should
challenge supporters of capital punishment to explain how the "legal
lynchings"2'52 of the modem death penalty are different from the illegal
historical lynchings. It is difficult to believe that a comprehensive cultural
study of the death penalty would not have discussed these matters. A
welcome first step would have been the inclusion of an essay in The Killing
248. Id.at 112.
249. See DONALD L. GRANT, THE ANTI-LYNCHING MOVEMENT: 1883-1932 (1975);
ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980).
250. See TOLNAY & BECK, supra note 245, at 233.
25 1. The elimination of federal funding of capital resource centers means that the states
have to fund indigent defense, which they have historically been reluctant to do. See Roscoe
C. Howard Jr., The Defunding ofthe Post Conviction Defense Organizationsas a Denial ofthe
Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 866 (1996) (discussing how states have historically
abdicated responsibility of finding competent counsel). The AEDPA has lead to the
streamlining of capital cases in the federal courts and has reduced the authority of the federal
courts to review alleged violations of federal law. The federal government's withdrawal of the
mechanisms designed to guarantee the enforcement of criminal defendants' constitutional rights
parallels the federal government's retrenchment in enforcing the federal civil rights of AfricanAmericans in the South beginning in the late 1880s. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND
REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951). One
southern practitioner, who is also a professor, says that the capital litigation process in the South
did not comply with federal guarantees before the most recent changes to federal law. See
generally Stephen B. Bright, Can JudicialIndependencebeAttainedin the South? Overcoming
History, Elections,andMisperceptionsAbout the Role ofthe Judiciary,14 GEO. ST. U. L. REv.
817 (1997) (recounting the history of the death penalty in the South, the impact of judicial
elections on capital case processing, and the regional attitudes toward those developments);
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,Death andDenial: The Tolerance ofRacialDiscrimination
in Infliction ofthe DeathPenalty, 35 SANTACLARA L. REV. 433 (1994) (detailing race prejudice
against African-Americans in the operation of the death penalty).
252. See JESSE JACKSON & JESSE JACKSON, JR., LEGAL LYNCHING: RACISM, INJUSTICE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY 96-110 (1996).
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State that explored connections between these themes.
In short, The Killing State tries to assess the cultural impact of capital
punishment without considering either the cultural expressions of groups that
most directly feel the brunt the death penalty or the perspectives of those that
most frequently apply it. As such, it presents an incomplete picture of the
cultural and social impact of capital punishment. Thus, despite its contention
otherwise, The Killing State is not a true cultural study of the death penalty.
B. Law and Society Scholarshipand the Death Penalty
One irony of The Killing State is that it appears to be largely the product
of Sarat, a law and society scholar." 3 Though it may be nearly impossible to
capture the breath and differences in approaches of all who claim that their
work falls within the law and society genre, Lawrence Friedman, one of the
group's recognized principals, has said that generally speaking, law and
society adherents are interested in illuminating how legal and social processes

253. Sarat co-wrote with Neil Vidmar one of the first modem social science articles using
empirical data to evaluate the death penalty. See Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion,
The DeathPenalty, and The Eighth Amendment: Testing the MarshallHypothesis, 1976 WISC.
L. REV. 171. In their article, Sarat and Vidmar attempted to test empirically Justice Marshall's
claim in Furman that support for the death penalty would decline if those polled were "fully
informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities," Furman,408 U.S. at 361, and that
the death penalty is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment if public support for it were
based solely on retribution. Id. at 343-45. Sarat and Vidmar concluded that, notwithstanding
the limited scope of their study, Marshall was basically correct. Among those they surveyed,
support for the death penalty declined when their subjects were informed of how capital
punishment was administered. According to Sarat and Vidmar, their findings had "narrowed
the field of reasonable argument for those who subscribe to the normative approach in death
penalty litigation." Sarat & Vidmar, supra, at 197. They suggested that the next area for
research was "to evaluate the legitimacy of retribution as an element in constitutional
construction" within the meaning of the "evolving standards of decency." Id.
When the United States Supreme Court next considered the constitutionality of the death
penalty, in Georgia v. Gregg, it ignored Sarat and Vidmar's research. The exception was
Justice Marshall, who cited the article, noting that "[a] recent study, conducted after the
enactment of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know little
about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly
from those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty." Gregg,
428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Sarat and Vidmar's findings were not determinative
for him, as he continued, "Even assuming, however, that the post-Furmanenactment of statutes
authorizing the death penalty renders the prediction of the views of an informed citizenry an
uncertain basis for a constitutional decision, the enactment of those statutes has no bearing
whatsoever on the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is excessive."
Id. at 232-33. In this regard Sarat and Vidmar were unsuccessful-even with Justice
Marshall-in their attempt to use empirical information to engage in "reasonable argument" on
the interpretation of the law.
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actually operate and what problems, if any, may exist."" They use the
methodologies of the social sciences to study and explain both law and the
legal system and law's impact on culture. 2 " Unlike most "orthodox legal
scholarship," studying law and legal phenomena often involves grappling with
the "grubby facts of day to day life. '256 Equally important is that "empirical
'
In other words, law and society
research is hard work, and lots of it."257
scholars seem to embody the claim that law is no longer "an autonomous
discipline," that is, "a subject properly entrusted to persons trained in the law
and in nothing else."2 ' The hope of the law and society movement is that
when properly calculated and calibrated, their theories and research will help
explain-and in some instances-solve the problems facing the legal system
and legal processes.5 9 In short, the law and society movement tries to answer
questions by moving beyond traditional or accepted explanations ofthe law.260
Elsewhere, Sarat and a co-author described the law and society
movement. 26 ' According to them, law and society scholars explore "how law
matters. 262 The study of the relationship between law and society has
resulted in two distinct approaches. An instrumentalist approach was
dominant in the 1960s. This method tries to assess how law or legal rules
have impacted a society. Implicitly, law is viewed as an independent variable

254. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763,
770-72 (1985).
255. Id. at 764-70.
256. Id. at 775.
257. Id. at 774.
258. Posner, supra note 11l, at 762.
259. See generally Richard D. Schwartz, From the Editor..., 1 L. & SOC'Y REv. 6, 7
(1966) ("[flew would deny the value of social sciences ultimately combining insights to
understand the larger picture").
260. The traditional legal process-based explanation for why a state has the death penalty
is that the legislature has enacted a statute authorizing the death penalty in appropriate cases
because a majority of the voters, whom the legislators represent, desire that thejurisdiction have
capital punishment as a sentencing option. Law and society members, however, might focus
on how capital offenders are portrayed by supporters of the death penalty and what sociological
factors are most likely to lead to the commission of a capital crime and to the imposition of the
death sentence. Further, a social-scientific inquiry into the impact of the death penalty may well
try to ascertain why a nation in general, and its voters in particular, believe that death as
punishment serves a proper penological or societal goal. Answers to these questions could lie
in surveys of voters and capital jurors and in a review of how issues of crime, law, and justice
are portrayed popularly and are communicated. Such inquiries, particularly when replicated
over time, might truly measure the impact of capital punishment on a particular society. The
social sciences and empirical research, therefore, should be able to assist in determining the
apparent attractiveness of capital punishment.
26 1. Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Studying How Law Matters: An Introduction,in
How DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
262. Id.at 1.
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whose influence can be measured.263 In other words, this approach asks,
"How does law influence society?" A second level of inquiry more recently
has become pronounced. This constitutive approach "sees law more as a
pervasive influence in structuring society than as a variable whose occasional
impact can be measured. 2 64 Constitutive law and society scholars treat law
as more than the formal legal rules of a society. This approach asks, "What
is the law, norms or values of a society? 2 65 The essays in The Killing State
seem to reflect both approaches in trying to assess the impact of the death
penalty on politics, culture, and the law.
VII. ON TENNESSEE: A CASE STUDY?

The Killing State's thesis that the death penalty corrupts politics, culture,
and the law can be tested by looking at Tennessee, which in 2000 became the
last southern state to resume executions after Gregg. Tennessee has had a
checkered history on the death penalty. As in many states, that history shows
periods of apparent rejection of the death penalty and times in which the
ultimate criminal sanction was fervently supported and promoted.2' As is
true with every state, Tennessee's administration of the death penalty has been
influenced by racism and class bias.
The death penalty was authorized when Tennessee was admitted to the
Union in 1796.267 As with other states with a significant black population, the
penal laws imposed harsher punishment on slaves and on free blacks than on
whites for the same conduct.26 8 In 1829, the state's first penal law codified the
state's homicide provision into a single statute.269 Consistent with a prevailing

263. Id. at 2.
264. Id.
265. In a different essay, Sarat and his co-author explore the themes of power and justice
as key organizing concepts in law and society scholarship from the late 1960s through the
1990s. See Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and Society Research:
On the Contested Careers of Core Concepts, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN LAW SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDIES (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
266. See generally Robert H. White, Historical Background Re Capital Punishment in
Tennessee, 19 W. TENN. HIST. SOC'Y PAPERS 69 (1965) (detailing capital punishment in
Tennessee from 1807 to 1965).
267. North Carolina adopted the common law of England, including the death penalty, as
its law. Thereafter, The Cession Act, N.C. Pub. Acts of 1789, ch. 3, which brought about the
creation of Tennessee out of western North Carolina territory, provided that North Carolina's
laws would remain in effect in Tennessee until changed by the new territory's government.
Tennessee's 1796 Constitution adopted North Carolina law as the state's law.
268. See Margaret Vandiver& Michel Coconis, "Sentenced to the Punishment ofDeath
Pre-FurmanCapitalCrimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 31 U. MEM. L. REV.
861, 867-73 (2000).
269. See Act of Dec. 9, 1829, ch. 23, 1829 Tenn. Pub. Acts 27, §§ 3, 4.
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national reform movement,27 this statute divided murder into degrees and
reserved the death penalty as mandatory punishment for first-degree murder.27 '
The condemned were to be executed by hanging by the neck.272 In 1838,
Tennessee Supreme Court justices were authorized to make a binding
certification to the governor that due to extenuating circumstances a death
sentence was to be commuted to life imprisonment.273 Nineteen years later,
the governor's authority to follow that recommendation was made
discretionary.274 Also in 1838, Tennessee was the first state to give juries
unguided sentencing authority in first-degree murder cases.275 Then in 1842,
the governor was given unbridled authority to commute death sentences.276
The death penalty was expanded in the 1860s and 1870s.277 Executions
became private events, and local wardens were removed from the process in
1909.278 The 1909 statute also designated Nashville as the central place for
all executions and permitted the prisoners' families to attend.27 9 The next
major change occurred in 1913, the result of another capital punishment
reform movement.2"' Tennessee's method of execution was changed from
hanging to electrocution.2"' For two years-1915 to 1917-the death penalty
was partially abolished.28 2 After a series of lynchings, the General Assembly

270.

Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: L 37

COLUM. L. REv. 701, 703 (1937); see also MASUR, supra note 7, at 73-92 (discussing the
reform movement).
271. See Act of Dec. 9, 1829, ch. 23, 1829 Tenn. Pub. Acts, §§ 3, 4.
272.

Id. at § 4.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55, § 1.
See CODE OF TENN. § 5259 (1858).
See Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55, § 1.
See Act of Jan. 26, 1842, ch. 55, 1841 Tenn. Pub. Acts 75.
See Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 268, at 873-75.
See Act of Apr. 22, 1909, ch. 500, 1909 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1810, § 1.
Id.

280. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method ofExecution?
The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 551, 565-77 (1993)

(detailing the reform movement and the adoption of electrocution as a method of execution).
281. See Act of Mar. 26, 1913, ch. 36, 1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 91, § 1. The change was
retroactive. See Shipp v. State, 172 S.W. 317, 318 (Tenn. 1914).
282. See Act of Mar. 28, 1915, ch. 181, 1916 Tenn. Pub. Acts (Acts of the Extra Session)
5, § 1; see also White, supra note 266, at 84 n.37 (stating that "Chapter[] 181 ...of the Public
Acts of 1915 will not be found in the bound volume of Public Acts of 1915. [It was] inserted
in Acts of the Extra Session of 1916"). In addition to substituting life imprisonment as the
punishment for the death penalty, the bill contained two exceptions. It provided: "That this Act
shall not interfere with the operation of statutes providing for the death penalty as a punishment
for the offense of rape" and "that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to convicts serving
life terms inthe State penitentiary who shall be convicted of any offense, now punishable under
the law by death by electrocution." Id. The partial abolition occurred over an attempted veto
by Govemor Rye. Rye returned five bills, including the abolition bill, to the General Assembly
but did so after the five day period required the by Tennessee Constitution. See Johnson City
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in 1917 reenacted the death penalty for all murders and rapes.283 Debates in
the General Assembly indicate that some legislators believed that the death
penalty assuaged mob violence. Apparently unsure of the legal status of the
1917 statute, the legislature two years later passed two other statutes
authorizing the death penalty.2" 4 The following year, Maurice Mays, a wellknown African-American in Knoxville, was convicted of murdering a white
woman and sentenced to death. After his first conviction was reversed on
28 6
appeal, 2 5 Mays was retried, convicted again, and after his appeals failed,
he was eventually executed. Today, Mays' case is often viewed as a wrongful
conviction28 7 brought about by racism and the threat of mob violence.8 8
Criminal law in general and capital punishment in particular remained
largely within the states' care until the 1960s, when the United States
Supreme Court slowly began to articulate federal constitutional principles for
criminal cases. Most of these decisions involved the process by which
criminal suspects and defendants were tried; a few involved substantive
criminal law. 219 In 1960, William Tines, an African-American, was executed

v. Tenn. E. Elec. Co., 182 S.W. 587, 589 (1916) (declaring the attempted vetoes invalid). The
most extensive source on the matter declares that the "listing of executions 1909-1915 is
probably incomplete and the exact number of executions is unknown." WILLtAM J. BOWERS,
LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 502 app. A (1984). It
lists Julius Morgan's July 16, 1916 execution for rape as the only one occurring during the
partial abolition. Id.
283. See Act of Jan. 31, 1917, ch. 14, 1917 Tenn. Pub. Acts 29, § 1.
284. See Act of Jan. 28, 1919, ch. 5, 1919Tenn. Pub. Acts 28, § 1. The second enactment
was apparently done out of an abundance of caution. See also Gohlson v. State, 223 S.W. 839,
840 (Tenn. 1920) (speculating regarding motive behind the first 1919 statute). The notes in the
compilation of state law say that the 1917 law was "clearly unconstitutional" because it violated
Article II, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, but the notes do not refer to a judicial
declaration of unconstitutionality. ANNOTATED CODE OF TENNESSEE BY SHANNON § 6442, at
5951-51 (1917).
285. See Mays v. State, 226 S.W. 233, 235 (Tenn. 1920).
286. See Mays v. State, 238 S.W. 1096, 1104 (Tenn. 1921).
287. See ROBERT J. BOOKER, THE HEATOFA RED SUMMER: RACE MIXING, RACE RIOTING
IN 1919 KNOXVILLE (2001); see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriagesof
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 53 (1987) (noting that a white
woman confessed to crime). But see Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protectingthe
Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121, 139-40 (1988)
(disputing Bedau's and Radelet's contention).
288. John Egerton, A Case of Prejudice: Maurice Mays and the Knoxville Race Riot of
1919, S. EXPOSURE, July/Aug. 1983, at 56. For a more recent telling of the pursuit of Mays and
subsequent race riots see Matthew Lakin, "A Dark Night ": The Knoxville Race Riot of 1919,
72 J. E. TENN. HIST. 1 (2000).
289. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (regarding a Texas statute
outlawing public intoxication); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962) (regarding
a California statute making an addiction to narcotics illegal); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225, 226 (1957) (regarding a California statute regarding registration of previously convicted
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for raping a white woman while on escape from a previous conviction. He
was officially the 134th person executed by Tennessee.290 Consistent with
developments in other states, the General Assembly in 1967 enacted a PostConviction Procedure Act, which provided a mechanism for prisoners to
challenge their conviction and sentence" and which created the Court of
Criminal Appeals as a forum for adjudicating criminal appeals and postconviction claims.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the existing system
of capital punishment in the United States,292 but four years later it upheld the
practice, as provided for in rewritten statutes.293 Since 1972, a number of
Tennesseans have supported the death penalty and have worked toward
resuming executions.294 In 1974295 and again in 1977296 the Tennessee
Supreme Court determined that the state's rewritten capital punishment
statutory schemes were unconstitutional. The General Assembly's third effort
was ruled constitutional in 1979.297 During the 1980s and 1990s, the state
supreme court addressed a number of legal issues, often relying on approaches
taken in federal courts in dealing with similar issues in other states.298
Tennessee resumed executions in April 2000 with the execution of Robert

criminals). For thoughts on how the Court's view of the criminal process affects substantive
criminal law, see Louis D. Bilionis, Process,the Constitution, andSubstantive CriminalLaw,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1998).
290. BOWERS, supra note 282, at 505 app. A.
291. See Gary L. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Tennessee-Fourteen Years of
JudicialAdministration Under the Post-ConvictionProcedureAct, 48 TENN. L. REV. 605,608
(1981) (describing the context giving rise to the enactment of the statute and its subsequent
interpretation).
292. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
293. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
294. See, e.g., Michael Finn, State, FederalReforms to Hasten Justice: Appeals Help
Keep KillersAlive, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Sept. 3, 1996, at A l. Consistent opposition to
the resumption of executions was also present. See, e.g., Mary Rehyansky, ExecutingJustice?:
Death Penalty Debate Comes to Chattanooga,CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, at Al
(noting anti-execution rallies).
295. State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712,717 (Tenn. 1974) (holding that the bill authorizing
the death penalty was unconstitutional because it violated the Tennessee Constitution's single
subject and caption provisions).
296. Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Tenn. 1977) (holding the mandatory death
penalty unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment).
297. Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765,767 (Tenn. 1979) (holding that the death penalty
statute does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Tennessee
Constitution); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1979) (holding that the ex post facto
provision of the Tennessee Constitution required reducing a death sentence to life
imprisonment, which was the most serious legally available punishment when the crime
occurred).
298. See Penny J. White, A Survey of Tennessee Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases in
the 1990s, 61 TENN. L. REV. 733, 734 (1994).
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Glen Coe for the murder of a girl. 2
To be sure, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state
government played a role in the resumption of executions in 2000. For
instance, while campaigning for governor in 1994, Congressman Don
Sundquist promised that if he were elected, executions would resume during
his tenure.3"
Sundquist was elected, and unlike his two immediate
predecessors, he helped enact legislation that streamlined the state postconviction process. Accordingly, since 1995, Tennessee post-conviction
petitions have been subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and prisoners
are now presumptively limited to a single petition.3"' In 1996, Justice Penny
299. Jon Yates & Jay Hamburg, Coe Execution Brings Conflicting Reactions; Victim's
Mother Finds ClosureAfter 21 Years, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 20, 2000, at IA.
Months before the Coe execution, the five-member Tennessee Supreme Court issued four
opinions, in a single case, addressing whether it should exercise its powers under section 4-27106 of the Tennessee Code Annotated to recommend that the governor commute a capital
sentence. The case, Workman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2000), is a particularly good
display of Cover's thesis that law and legal interpretation impose violence upon those subject
to it. Four of the justices concluded that they should not make the recommendation. Id. at 809.
Two of these justices concluded that the facts contained in the court record did not demonstrate
that extenuating circumstances existed for commutation. Id. (Anderson, C.J., with Holder, J.,
concurring). The other two justices, each for different reasons, concluded that no legal basis
existed for recommending commutation; one emphasized executive clemency as a potential
avenue for relief, id. at 812-13 (Drowota, J., concurring), and the other believed that the statute
was obsolete and possibly unconstitutional as an infringement of separation of powers
principles. Id. at 814-16 (Barker, J., concurring). The remaining justice recommended
commutation, but did not offer a rationale. Id. at 816-17 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting).
The various opinions are a cornucopia of interpretative methodologies; they prove that legal
interpretation is an art. Cf Lon L. Fuller, The Caseof the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 616 (1949) (offering fictional high court opinions, through differing jurisprudential and
interpretative methods and addressing the court's legal authority to order a remedy in a capital
case); Symposium, The Case of The Speluncean Explorers: ContemporaryProceedings,61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1754 (1993) (giving fictional high court opinions based on Fuller's
hypothetical but incorporating modem jurisprudential methods). Cover's metaphor applies
here. All justices wrote knowing that the possibility of death hinged on their individual votes.
To the extent that any of the justices in Workman proffered a forced legal interpretation,
"violence" was done, according to Cover.
300. See Mark Curriden, Isjustice denied? Legal agency reaps blame as a barrierto
executions, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at Al (describing criticism of Tennessee's
Capital Case Resource Center, which assisted capital defendants in challenging their convictions
and sentences).
301. The original Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1967 did not include a statute of
limitations. See Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 310, 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts 801, § 1. In 1986, the
General Assembly adopted a three-year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1986, ch. 634, 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 348, § I. The limitations period was
shortened to one year for petitions filed after May 10, 1995. See Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, ch. 207, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 305, § I (amended by Act of Apr. 25, 1996, ch. 995, 1996
Tenn. Pub. Acts 753, § I and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a)).
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White was not retained as a Justice on the Tennessee Supreme Court after a
campaign alleging that she did not support the death penalty.30 2 Two years
later, in response to increasing public criticism, the state courts implemented
changes to more quickly process capital cases.30 3 Also in the late 1990s, the
federal courts began to deny more federal habeas capital petitions from
Tennessee inmates than they granted. 3" Most significantly, the Coe execution
was made possible by the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling on two
previously unaddressed issues: a protocol for a prisoner's competency for
execution3" 5 and a process for setting execution dates and the filing of
commutation motions.
The lull in executions in Tennessee might be best explained by Franklin
Zimring's Inheritingthe Wind: The Supreme Courtand CapitalPunishment
in the 1990s.3" 7 Zimring observed that those states that have been historically

302. Tom Humphrey, WhiteBecomes lstAppellate-LevelJudgeto be Defeated in 'Yes-No'
Vote; Massive Opposition to Death Penalty Vote Overcomes Support, KNOXVILLE
NEWS-SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al.
303. Phil West, Chiefjustice gives state ofjudiciary, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 20,
1998, at B3.
304. See infra note 310. In a speech, Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt noted that in the
preceding fifteen years, a federal writ of habeas corpus had been issued in eight of the twelve
Tennessee capital cases that had completed review. John Shiffiman, Deathpenalty system needs
fix, judge says, THE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 27, 2002, at I A (citing Judge Gilbert Merritt, Speech
Before the Tennessee Bar Association (Sept. 26, 2002)).
305. See Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 273-74 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1091 (2000). Van Tran held that a death row prisoner could only raise the issue of mental
competency to be executed in response to the Tennessee Attorney General's motion to the
Tennessee Supreme Court to set an execution date. Id. at 274. The Tennessee Supreme Court
would then issue an order on the execution date and remand the case to the trial court in which
the prisoner was sentenced for a ruling on the competency claim. Id. If appropriate
documentation by the prisoner was necessary, the trial court would then decide if a hearing was
necessary. Id. Van Tran also established the time period by when subsequent court proceedings
had to occur, the standard by which mental competency claims were to be adjudicated, the time
period that trial courts had to decide the claim, the form and content of the trial court's opinion
on the claim, the appellate review process of the claim, and the requirement that there should
be subsequent monitoring of mentally incompetent prisoners. Id. at 273-74.
306. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 251, 251 (Tenn. 2000) (stating that once the original
execution date has expired as a result of a stay, the Tennessee Supreme Court has continuing
jurisdiction to issue another execution date and the Tennessee Attorney General need not move
the court to set a new execution date); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tenn. 2000)
(declaring that the time to file motion for commutation is generally after the direct appeals
process is completed; the standard for granting a commutation is that facts in the record or
combination of record facts and new evidence show that extenuating circumstances exist that
warrant commutation); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tenn. 1999) (stating that defendant
has a duty to challenge his present mental competency to be executed when the Attorney
General files motion to set the execution date).
307. 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:391

inclined to execute did so in the 1980s and early 1990s.3 °s According to
Zimring, whether states proceeded with executions depended heavily on the
political climate within the state and on the interaction between federal law
and procedure in the capital litigation process. °9 Similarly, in Tennessee,
executions eventually resumed because both the legal and political climates
indicated sufficient interest and no state or federal institution was interested
in preventing that resumption.°

308. Id. at 12.
309. " Id. at 12-13.
310. A common perception is that federal district Judge John T. Nixon was the cause of
the suspension of executions from 1960 to 2000. For instance, by 1997 the following "joke
[was] circulated through the Tennessee Attorney General's Office. Q: 'When will the state
finally execute someone? A: Two years after Nixon leaves the bench."' Louis Graham, 39
Beat Death Without Nixon, COMMERCIALAPPEAL, June 9, 1997, at Al. At least half ofthe forty
year delay is no way attributable to him, however, as he did not become a federal judge until
1980. The first state capital cases reached him in 1985. He granted habeas corpus relief in each
of the five cases that he decided, after considering each petition for years. Id. In actuality, from
1977 to 1997, state courts ordered a new trial or a re-sentencing in 55 of 141 capital cases, with
39 capital defendants receiving a sentence other than death at their re-sentencing. State courts
ordermost death penalty rejections,CHATTANOOGA TIMES, June 10, 1997, at B2.
During this period, Nixon, as the Chief Judge of the Middle District of Tennessee, in which
the state's death row population is housed (Riverbend Maximum Correctional Institution), was
the only federal judge considering state capital habeas petitions. Judge Nixon granted the writ
of habeas corpus in each capital habeas cases he reviewed, and the Sixth Circuit usually
affirmed his decision. See, e.g., Houston v. Dixon, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995) (vacating the
issuance of the writ to the extent that it was based on insufficient evidence to convict for murder
and affirming the issuance of the writ based on unconstitutional jury instructions but reversing
issuance to the extent that it vacated the petitioner's armed robbery conviction); Austin v. Bell,
938 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), affd in part,rev'din part,and remanded, 126 F.3d 843
(6th Cir. 1997) (reversing issuance of the writ to the extent that it found the jury instruction
unconstitutional but affirming issuance based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Groseclose
v. Bell, 895 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Tenn. 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming
issuance of the writ because the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel); Rickman
v. Bell, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), aft'd, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming
issuance of the writ because the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel). But see
Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (reversing grant of the
writ after concluding that the jury instructions were constitutionally sufficient, procedurally
barred, or if defective, harmless error).
After he took senior status in 1996, other Tennessee federal district judges handled state
habeas capital petitions. These other federal district judges usually have not granted the writ,
and their decisions typically have been affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, also. See, e.g., House v.
Bell, 283 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of the writ by Judge Jarvis); Hutchinson
v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of the writ by Judge Jarvis); Caldwell
v. Bell, Nos. 99-6219; 99-6307, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10769, at *26 (6th Cir. May 17, 2001)
(affirming denial of the writ); Abdur'rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing
the district court's vacatur of the death sentence), dismissed, 537 U.S. 88 (2002); Alley v. Bell,
307 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of the writ by Judge Donald); Workman v. Bell,
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Though it is nearly impossible to prove a negative, there are virtually no
signs that the nonlegal cultural indicia that The Killing State relies
on-movies, television programs, and books-as produced and consumed by
Tennesseans, were becoming or have become more degenerate either before
or since the resumptions of executions in Tennessee.3"' Thus, it cannot be
said, as represented in The KillingState, that having executions "undermine [d]
democracy and the rule of law" or "nurture[d] a culture of ... resentment and
recrimination,"
any more than it can be claimed that not having executions did
3 12
SO.

VIII. CONCLUSION: DEATH PENALTY SCHOLARSHIP AND
MOVING TOWARD ABOLITION

It is past time for a cultural examination of the modem capital punishment
system; however, The Killing State is not it. As laudatory as its goal of being
an interdisciplinary book on the death penalty, The Killing State largely
misses the mark of detailing capital punishment's impact on law, politics, and
society. Though The Killing State does not achieve fully its objective of a
cultural study of the death penalty, it nonetheless might cause some to ponder
13
the larger meaning and potential influence of death penalty scholarship.'
Death penalty abolitionist scholarship that considers matters beyond legal
doctrine would be welcome.314 This kind of scholarship would more likely
bring about reconsideration of the penal laws to more directly address
178 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of the writ by Judge Gibbons), motion for en
banc proceeding denied, 227 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2001); King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151 (6th Cir.
1994) (affirming denial of the writ by Judge Hull). But see Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961 (6th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1843 (2002) (reversing that part of Judge McCalla's decision
denying the writ for ineffective assistance of counsel); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir.
2000) (reversing denial of the writ by Judge Hull); O'Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (reversing the grant of the writ by Judge Morton and dismissing the "mixed"
petition); see also Black v. Bell, 181 F. Supp. 2d 832 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)(denial of the writ by
Judge Campbell).
311. One might argue that the Tennessee General Assembly's refusal to enact a state
income tax in 2000 and 2001, and its related curtailing of TennCare, a medical network of
health care providers for Medicaid patients, uninsured, and uninsurable Tennesseans, is
evidence that state policies reflect greater indifference to the plight of its more vulnerable
citizens than in previous years. This argument ignores several variables including that the tax
issue has been repeatedly disfavored by Tennesseans, and that not everyone who supports a state
income tax opposes the death penalty, and vice versa.
312. See THE KILLING STATE, supra note 3, at 4.
313. One benefit of reading The Killing State and other ambitious scholarship is that it
might inspire some to think about the death penalty and the support that exists for it. A
forthcoming project of mine considers an aspect of empirical documentation of the death
penalty. See Dwight Aarons, Keeping It Real: Empiricism, the Death Penalty and Death
Penalty Legal Scholarship(work in progress).
314. According to the book's Introductory Essay, The Killing State is such a work.
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criminal violence, perhaps leading to a full re-evaluation of the need for and
use of the death penalty. Rather than championing the broad-sided slogan of
legal interpretation as violence, abolitionist death penalty scholarship should
rely on enduring principles. In the United States, a starting place for the
cataloguing of some enduring precepts might be with beliefs that are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,"3 5 those "principles of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"3 6
such that a "fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
'
without them."317
To the extent that inquiries such as this are too limited,318
abolitionists might appeal as well to what the United States Supreme Court
has called the "Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice" 319 that protects
the "dignity of man. '320 Abolitionists should embrace the idea that the "power
to punish [has to] be exercised within civilized standards."32' Deviations-from
civilized standards should be documented, prosecutions under uncivilized
standards reversed,322 and those responsible for the deficiencies should be
taken to task. Capital punishment abolitionists in the United States should
remind those who support the death penalty that the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly declared that the concept of cruel and unusual
punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency
323
that mark the progress of a maturing society.
A majority of United States citizens probably have not embraced the
abolitionist position on the death penalty because no legal, cultural, or social
framework for abolition has been created. 324 The Killing State only indirectly
sheds light on present legal, cultural, and social conditions. Abolitionist

315.
316.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).

317.

Id.

318.

Cf Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty

Unconstitutional,83 HARV.L. REV. 1773, 1782-84 (1970) (arguing that long usage of the death

penalty cannot be determinative of its continued use and advocating for reliance on enlightened
standards in society to determine the constitutionality of capital punishment).
319. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
320.
321.

Id.
Id.

322. E.g., Dominguesv. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280-81 (Nev. 1998) (Rose, 1, dissenting)
(asserting that Senate reservations to an international treaty prohibiting the execution of
individuals under age 18 were invalid and therefore the convictedjuvenile's death sentence was
illegal).
323.

Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.

324. Herbert H. Haines has documented the history of the grassroots opposition to the
death penalty, its reasons for failure, and future prospects of death penalty abolitionism. See
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT

INAMERICA, 1972-1994 (1996). As with the abolition of slavery, death penalty abolitionists
have to expand their efforts to create a more widespread grassroots campaign. See NEWMAN,
supra note 220.
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writings should try to shift the terms of the debate. 25 This paradigm shift
might be helped by eventually tying the rejection of capital punishment to
substantive criminal law. 6 and human rights-based principles.327 In short,

325. Perhaps the so-called moratorium movement that seems to exist presently will lead
to abolition. One commentator has discussed this movement, compared it with other law reform
movements, and out lined strategies and other factors necessary for sustaining it. See Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the
United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2002).
326. Years ago, a commentator noted that there were relatively few constitutional
limitations on substantive criminal law. See Note, The Cruel and UnusualPunishmentClause
and the Substantive CriminalLaw, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 655 (I 966). That remains largely
true today. More recently Louis Bilionis has argued that "the Constitution and substantive
criminal law in fact are engaged in aserious, long-running relationship that is amply manifested
in dozens of Supreme Court opinions...." Bilionis, supra note 289, 1272. He says that this
relationship began at least as early as the late 1950s. Id. at 1269. Bilionis recounts the legal
academy's exploration of substantive criminal law, citing to law review articles that have
considered the interaction between the Constitution and substantive criminal law. Id. at 129498 & nn. 113-15. Bilionis briefly discusses capital cases. Id. at 1319-20, 1326-27. He says that
the Court's capital decisions have stimulated political deliberation based on moral sensibilities.
Id. at 1326-27.
327. Some philosophical justifications for recognizing "human rights" in the United States
Constitution are found in MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE

(1982). Perry defines "human rights" as individual constitutional rights. He
primarily discusses freedom of expression, equal protection of the laws, and substantive due
process rights relative to the family. Id. at 5. After his most pertinent discussion regarding the
death penalty, see id. at 100-15, Perry writes that the type of United States Supreme Court
review that he advocates can serve "as an agency of moral reevaluation and moral growth." Id.
at 115. The answers that the Court provides are not dependent on the views of the majority,
either now or in the future. Rather, the Court should aspire to give right answers to fundamental
political-moral problems. Id.
Martha Davis observes the negative consequences of the United States judicial system's
continued failure to consider international and human rights principles:
The issue is, for want of a better word, legitimacy. Globalization has now so pervaded our
national culture and identities that acourt that consistently ignores international precedents
and experiences when considering human rights issues, even if merely for their persuasive
or moral weight, risks irrelevancy. Historically, the United States judicial system has not
ignored, but responded, to such threats to its legitimacy. Based on that history, it would
be remarkable if aresponse to the changes marked by globalization and the breakdown of
the dichotomy between national and international human rights law were not in the offing.
JUDICIARY

To maintain their legitimacy, courts-and particularly higher courts--considering human
rights issues must routinely consider the practices of other nations and the international
norms reflected in customary international law and international instruments.
To date, U.S. judges have stood back from these developments. As this isolationist
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abolitionist lawyers do not have to wait for the courts to abolish the death
penalty', for the courts to outlaw the death penalty, however, abolitionists have
to advocate for its abolition. 2 Unfortunately, The Killing State may only
dimly point the way toward abolition of the death penalty.

approach continues, the legitimacy and relevance of U.S. judicial decisions will be
increasingly open to question. However, as with the Court's response to the challenges
of the Progressive era, the United States judicial system has always shown an ability to
incorporate such paradigm shifts into its modes of decisionmaking.
Martha F. Davis, InternationalHuman Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a

Courtwatcher,64 ALB. L. REv. 417, 421,424, 436 (2000). Another scholar has noted:
the original Bill of Rights was essentially negative. It marked off a world of the spirit in
which government should have no jurisdiction .... It assumed

. . .

the citizen had no

claim upon government except to be let alone. Today, the political theory which
acknowledges the duty of government to provide jobs, social security, medical care, and
housing extends to the field of human rights and imposes an obligation to promote liberty,
equality, and dignity.
Archibald Cox, Foreword:ConstitutionalAdjudicationandthe PromotionofHuman Rights,

80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 93 (1966); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to
Inform DueProcessand EqualProtectionAnalyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983) (advocating

incorporating human rights norms through the Bill of Rights).
328. One author outlines generally how lawyers litigating for social change should
proceed.
To restrict oneself to arguments the Court now accepts is to forget the basic legal realist
tenet that the reason a judge votes the way he votes is not necessarily the reason he is
prepared to set forth as his official rationale. Ajudge will be more likely to read precedent
as permitting a broader range of action if the judge is personally convinced there are good
reasons to do so, even if those good reasons are reasons .... that must go unstated.

Ultimately the ideal is to convince the Court to bring its stated rationale into line with its
felt commitments, and to do so where necessary by reconsidering its prior opinions and
decisions. Until that happens, the advocate has two jobs: to convince the Court it wants
to go her way and that there is an intellectually honest way to do so. To the extent that
advocates limit their arguments to ones that are currently acceptable to the Court as
permissible rationales, they do only part of their job.
Suppose, however, that we stop being judicial realists for the moment and take the view
that, in advocacy to the courts, one cannot allude to arguments the courts have rejected in
the past. Does that mean that public discourseon [matters under litigation] should restrict
itself to rationales upon which the courts are presently willing to rely? Absolutely not.
Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, andthe Black Middle Class,68 U. CoLO.

L.REv. 939,946-47 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Professor Fran Ansley graciously provided this
citation.

